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NOTE

Interference with Non-National Ships on
the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to
the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State
Jurisdiction
I am indeed lord of the world,
but the law is lord of the sea.
-Antoninus
ABSTRACT

Pursuant to the exclusivity rule offlag-state jurisdiction,a ship on the
high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state whoseflag she
lawfully flies. Conversely, a state may not ordinarily interfere with those
ships registeredunder the laws of another state. Internationallaw makes
exception to this general rule in certain discrete circumstances. When
such an exception exists, a state may lawfully stop, visit, search, and
arrest a non-national ship on the high seas-a right normally reserved
to the flag-state alone. These exceptions to the exclusivity rule offlag-state
jurisdictionform the subject matter of this Note.
The author begins with a brief history of the origin of the exclusivity
rule offlag-state jurisdictionand the development of the rule in international jurisprudence. The Note then provides a discussion of the two
modes of permissible interference-the customary right of reconnaissance
and the droit de visite. The simple right of reconnaissance affords a pub-

lic ship the right to approach a private vessel on the high seas to inquire
her identity. The more elaborate droit de visite is composed of two distinct
operations: the droit d'enqu&e du pavillion and the right of visitation
and search. Pursuant to her droit d'enqu~te du pavillion, a public ship

may board a private vessel to ascertain the private vessel's right to her
flag. If warranted, the boardingparty may proceed to search the vessel to
determine whether she is engaged in some proscribed activity.
The author finds that in time of peace a state may not interfere with
the ships of another state unless there exists an exception to the exclusiv-
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ity rule offlag-state jurisdiction.Exceptions to the exclusivity rule permit
a state to proceed against a vessel suspected of being (1) a pirate; (2) a
trader in slaves; (3) a stateless ship; (4) a threat to the security or integrity of the state; or (5) in actuality a ship belonging to the interfering
state, althoughflying the flag of another state. These exceptions exist as a
matter of customary internationallaw and are therefore available to all
states. States may also enter into treaty regimes that permit a mutual
right of interference, but such an exceptional right is enforceable against
treaty parties only. Such a right may exist in the case of suspected pirate
radio broadcasters.The author addresseseach customary exception to the
exclusivity rule as well as the pirate radio broadcasterexception, all of
which are codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
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INTRODUCTION

On 4 December 1989, the United States Navy confronted on the high
seas members of the environmental group Greenpeace, who had hoped to
disrupt the test launch of a Trident nuclear missile by a United States
submarine.' Despite repeated radio warnings, the protestors' vessel
Greenpeace, registered in the Netherlands, encroached upon the fivethousand yard security zone drawn around the nuclear submarine standing fifty miles off the Florida coast.' The Greenpeace dispatched two
motorized rafts, from which members of the environmental group attempted to confound the launch of the missile. The Navy towed away
the rafts, but when the Greenpeace refused to quit the launch site, two
Navy submarine tenders approached the Greenpeace and shouldered her
from the area. In the process, the Greenpeace sustained two gashes in
her hull and began to take water. Although the Greenpeace returned
safely to port, a spokeswoman for Greenpeace reported that the organization would consider a suit against the United States. For its part, the
Navy disputed the asserted right of Greenpeace to obstruct the missile
launch.'
Myriad questions of international and domestic law flow from the
Greenpeace incident, but perhaps the most interesting question is the one
to which this Note is primarily devoted-whether in peacetime the warships of a state may on the high seas interfere with a private ship registered under the laws of another state?
As a general proposition, a state may not interfere with the vessels of
another state. Pursuant to the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction,
ships on the high seas are subject only to the jurisdiction of the state
whose flag they. lawfully fly. International law, however, draws several
exceptions to the exclusivity rule. These exceptions, which form the subject matter of this Note, arise only in certain discrete circumstances.
!

1.
1989,
2.
3.

Schmalz, Afte'r Skirmish with Protesters,Navy Tests Missile, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
at Al, col. 2.
Id. at A12, col. 1.
Id. at Al, col. 3; A12, cols. 1-2.
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Exceptions to the exclusivity rule exist as a matter of both customary
and conventional law. Customary law permits a state to interfere with a
non-national vessel if she is (1) a pirate; (2) a slave trader; (3) a threat
to the state; (4) without nationality; or (5) in actuality a ship of the
interfering state, although flying the flag of another state. Apart from
these customary exceptions, states sometimes agree by treaty to make an
exception to their right of exclusive jurisdiction in order to achieve some
desirable end, such as the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from
the high seas. These conventional exceptions apply only between the
parties to the convention and are not, like the customary exceptions, universally applicable.
This Note considers the circumstances in which one state may proceed
against the ships of another. The Note first sets out the manner in which
a state may interfere with the vessels of another state and the rules that
govern such interference. The remainder of the Note discusses the exceptions to the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction.
II.
A.

INTERFERENCE ON THE HIGH SEAS

The Exclusivity Rule of Flag-StateJurisdiction

Ships on the high seas are, as a general rule, subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction and authority of the state whose flag they lawfully fly. This
principle of exclusivity of flag-state jurisdiction is a pillar of the international law of the sea and is firmly rooted in the axioms of state equality
and the freedom of the high seas.' The Permanent Court of Interna-

4. These principles-the exclusivity of flag-state jurisdiction, the freedom of the seas,
and the equality of states-go hand in hand; the exclusivity rule follows from the freedom of the high seas which in turn follows from the equality of states. This proposition
is cogently set out in the English case of Le Louis, in which Lord Stowell observed:
[A]Il nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the
unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation. In places where no local
authority exists, where the subjects of all states meet upon a footing of entire
equality and independence, no one state, or any of its subjects, has a right to
assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another.
Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 243, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475 (1817). On the other side of the
Atlantic, Justice Story held in the United States case of The Marianna Flora that
"[ulpon the ocean, then, in time of peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common
highway of all, appropriated to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a
superior or exclusive prerogative there." The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1,
42 (1826). For a more recent affirmation of this principle, see United States v. Hensel,
699 F.2d 18, 27 (lst Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). The prin-
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tional Justice articulated this principle in the Lotus case, finding that
vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State
whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas,
that is to say, the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the high seas,
no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon
them."
The exclusivity rule is codified in the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, which provides that "[slhips shall sail under the flag of one State
only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high

ciples of state sovereignty and the absolute equality of states, therefore, afford all states
equal right to the free and unmolested use of areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state,
including the high seas.
The notion of the freedom of the high seas contains both a right and an obligation. A
corollary to the right of equal use of the high seas is the obligation to refrain from
interference in the lawful utilization of the high seas by other states. The International
Law Commission (I.L.C.) discusses the permissive and the obligatory nature of the freedom of the high seas as follows:
The freedom of the high seas, essentially negative, may nevertheless contain positive consequences .... All maritime flag-states have equal right to put the high
seas to legitimate use. But the idea of equality of usage comes only in second place.
The essential idea contained in the principle of the freedom of the high seas is the
idea of interdiction of all flag-states from interference in navigation in time of
peace with all other flag-states.
Memorandum prksent par le Secretariat,U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/32, reprintedin [1950] 2
Y.B. I.L.C. 67, 69, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (translation).
From this obligation to refrain from interference with non-national vessels flows the
principle of exclusivity of flag-state jurisdiction. See generally J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS

304-10 (Sir H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963); I. BROWNLIE,

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC

238-42 (3d ed. 1979); 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
645-47 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW]; 2 D.
O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 796-99 (I. Shearer ed. 1984)
[hereinafter O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA]; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§§ 248-59 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
5. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 25 (Sept.
27).
6. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, art.
6(1), 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30,
1962) [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].
The article most relevant to the present inquiry is article 22, which provides:
INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified
in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
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seas.")6 This provision is re-codified in the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea.

7

(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above, the warship
may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a
boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains
after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on
board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded
has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or
damage that may have been sustained.
Id. art. 22.
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, art. 92(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 [hereinafter Convention on the Law of
the Sea], reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
Article 110 is most pertinent to this Note:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity . . ., is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the
warship has jurisdiction... ;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify
the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command
of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the, documents have
been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which
must be carried out with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded
has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or
damage that may have been sustained.
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.
5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships of aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service.
Id. art. 110.
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is the most comprehensive multilateral
agreement on the international law of the sea. The Convention is "the culmination of
over 14 years of work involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all
regions of the world, all legal and political systems [and] all degrees of socio-economic
development." UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA, at xix, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983). In over three hundred articles, the Convention on Law of the Sea addresses nearly every area of the law of the sea, including the territorial sea, navigation,
the contiguous zone, archipelagic states, the exclusive economic* zone, the continental
shelf, the high seas, islands, the environment, and deep sea-bed mining.

19891

FLAG-STATE JURISDICTION EXCEPTIONS

The exclusivity rule is not, however, an absolute rule from which no
derogation is permitted. International law permits interference with nonnational ships in certain discrete circumstances defined by customary or
conventional law. These circumstances are, however, very much exceptional to the general rule that jealously safeguards the exclusive competence of a state to assert jurisdiction over its own shipping. Halleck
warns:
To enter into [a non-national] vessel, or to interrupt its course, by a foreign power in time of peace ...

is an act of force, and is primb fade, a

wrong, a trespass, which can be justified only when done for some purpose, allowed to form a sufficient justification by the law of nations. The
right of a vessel of one State to visit and search a vessel of another State on
the high seas, in any case, is therefore an exception to the general rights of
property, jurisdiction, equality, and independence of sovereign States.'
The presumption is against the legitimacy of any exception and the burden of proof in contentious cases rests with the state asserting the
exception.9
Exceptions to the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction are either
customary or conventional.1 0 Customary exceptions to the exclusivity
The Convention on the Law of the Sea is not yet in force. The Convention provides
that it shall enter into force one year "after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument
of ratification or accession." Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra, art. 308(1). As of
2 March 1989, only thirty-nine states had ratified the Convention. 13 LAW OF THE SEA
BULLETIN 5 (United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, No. 8916301, May 1989). The United States has not signed the Convention. Id. Nor is the
United States expected to ratify the Convention in its present form, due in large part to
the controversial deep sea-bed regime set out in the agreement. See Statement of President Ronald Reagan, reprinted in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
CURRENT POL'Y No. 416, LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEANS POLICY 1 (July-Aug. 1982).
The 1982 Convention incorporates much of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
and makes substantial additions to that earlier agreement. The provisions of the 1982
Convention may be viewed as codifications of existing customary international law insofar as such provisions duplicate the provisions of the 1958 agreement, which is "generally declaratory of established principles of international law." Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 6, preamble. The provisions with which this Note is primarily concerned may be found without substantive variation in both conventions and are for the
most part codifications of customary international law, as demonstrated below.
8. 2 H. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (S.Baker 3d ed. 1893).
9. C. CoLoMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 311 (6th rev. ed. 1967).
10. Halleck observes that "to justify [interference] it must be shown that the particular case comes clearly within the exceptions to this rule [of exclusivity of flag-state jurisdiction], which have been established by the positive law of nations, or by treaty stipulations between the parties." 2 H. HALLECK, supra note 8, at 239.
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas maintains the distinction between customary
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rule exist under the general law of nations, and every state may exercise
these exceptions as a general right."1 Conventional exceptions, conversely, are particular contractual arrangements enforceable by and
against only those states party to the treaty regime establishing the exception. 2 No bright line test separates the customary from the conventional exceptions; customary rules are often codified in treaties and treaty
provisions occasionally evolve into custom. In time of peace,14 no state

and conventional exceptions to the exclusivity rule. The Convention provides, "Ships
shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in internationaltreaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas." Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 6(1)
(emphasis added); cf. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 92(1). The
"in these articles" language is doubtless a reference to customary law, which the Convention purports to codify. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, preamble.
11. Gidel characterizes customary exceptions as measures of "police gfnral," which
arise
indfpendamment de conventions et r~sultent purement et simplement de la coutume. Elles ont 6galement ce caractre de pouvoir &re exercees par tous les navires
de guerre (ou Eventuellement d'autres navires publics) A l'gard de tous les navires
privfs, quel que soit le pavillon qu'ils battent; elles sont en outre g~nfrales en ce
qu'elles ne sont pas localis~es A certaines zones maritimes; elles sont g6nfrales,
enfin, en ce qu'elles ne sont pas relatives a un ordre d'activit6 d&erminE.
1 G. GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 289 (1932) (reprint 1981).
12. Gidel writes that the conventional exceptions, or measures of "police spfciale,"
n'existent qu'en vertu de conventions: elles ne peuvent donc s'appliquer qu'entre
les Etats parties a ces conventions; elles sont spciale 6galement en ce qu'elles se
rapportent Ades activitfs d6termin6es (par exemple: pehe, cables sous-marins, etc.
I 1.).
r~sulte de la 6galement qu'elles sont Iocalisfes aux parages ou ces activit~s
sont susceptibles de s'exercer.
Id. at 289. Dupuy and Vignes observe:
[Alfin de mieux assurer le respect des rtgles de police en haute mer, les Etats on
de plus en plus tendence A limiter par le droit conventionnel l'exclusivit6 de I'Etat
du pavillon en confiant a leurs navires de guerre respectifs la responsibilitE de
rechercher et de constater la violation des rtgles de police pour les navires qui
arborent leur pavillon, la repression des infractions commises continuant A relever,
dans la plupart des cas, de la comp&ence des tribunaux de l'Etat du pavilion. II
s'agit lA des polices spfciales de la haute iner, par opposition a la police gfnrale
exerc6e par les navires de guerre conform6ment au droit coutumier.
R. DuPuY & D. VIGNES, TRAIT NOUVEAU DROIT DE LA MER 370-71 (1985).
13, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den./W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 4, 41-42,
14. There does exist a jure belli right of interference with non-national ships. Indeed, the right of visit was once thought exclusively a belligerent right. See J. FRASCON, ,
VISIT, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE OF THE HIGH SEAS (1938); 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 764-65 (2d

rev. ed. 1947). This issue, however, falls outside the ambit of this Note and will not be
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may interfere with the shipping of another state unless the interfering
state possesses an exceptional right clearly vested by customary law or
pursuant to a particular treaty regime.15
B.

Interference with Non-National Ships

When justified by a customary or conventional exception to the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction, a state may interfere with a vessel of
another state on the high seas. Although the nature of this interference
varies, justifiable acts of interference fall under two general rubrics: the
right of reconnaissance and the droit de visite (right of visit)."6 The
least obtrusive mode of interference is the right of reconnaissance-a
simple right permitting a warship to request that the encountered ship
show her flag. The droit de visite, on the other hand, involves physical
interference with the suspect vessel. The droit de visite is actually composed of two distinct operations: the droit d'enqu~te du pavillon (right
of investigation of flag) and the right of search. A state may exercise her
droit d'enqute du pavillon to ascertain whether the encountered ship is
entitled to the flag she flies. In the most extreme cases, a state may proceed to search the vessel.
1. The Right of Reconnaissance
Under the customary law of nations, the public ships of every state
may approach a vessel on the high seas to ascertain her identity and
nationality." This right of reconnaissanceis a perfect customary right. 8

addressed here. For a discussion of the belligerent exception to the exclusivity rule, see 3
R. PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 255-75 (3d ed. 1885)
(discussing belligerent rights in the context of the Alabama arbitrations).
15. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110.
16. I shall refer to the various modes of interference by their French
names-partially to avoid the confusion that exists among English-speaking writers as to
the proper name of each mode, and partially to honor and acknowledge the French academic Gilbert Charles Gidel, whose contribution to the law of the sea proved invaluable
in the preparation of this Note. I adopt M. Gidel's terminology.
17. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 247; C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 311; 1
G. GIDEL, supra note 11, at 288-90; van der Mensbrugghe, Le pouvoir de police des

etats en haute mer, 11

REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

56, 60-61 (1975).

18. Smith writes that the right of reconnaissance "is the only qualification under
customary law of the general principle which forbids any interference in time of peace

with ships of another nationality upon the high seas." H.

SMITH, THE LAW AND CUS-

64 (3d ed. 1959). While Smith probably overstates the point, it is true
that every public ship may at all times exercise this right of reconnaissance.The exercise
of the right, consequently, is not dependent on the existence of an exception to the excluTOM OF THE SEA
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The United States Supreme Court has held:
In respect to ships of war

.

.

, there is no reason why they may not

approach any vessels descried at sea, for the purpose of ascertaining their
real characters. Such a right seems indispensable for the fair and discreet
exercise of their authority; and the use of it cannot be justly deemed indicative of any design to insult or injure those they approach, or to impede
them in their lawful commerce. 9
The right of reconnaissance is limited to the right to approach a ship to
identify her. An approaching warship may request that an encountered
vessel show her colors, which are prima facie evidence of nationality.2 °
Without evidence to counter this showing of nationality, a warship may
not board the encountered vessel and, afortiori, may not proceed to examine her papers or perform a search. 2
2.

The Droit de Visite

Under extreme circumstances, the public ships of a state are competent to visit and search the vessels of another state. This droit de visite is
not a perfect customary right and, unlike the right of reconnaissance,
does not obtain unless provided by a customary or conventional exception
to the general rule of noninterference.2 2 The droit de visite, or right of
sivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction. That is, a public ship may inquire the nationality of
any ship she meets on the high seas regardless of whether there exists reason to suspect
she has committed an international delict.
19. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 43-44 (1826).
20. 2 H. HALLECK, supra note 8, at 250 n.2; I J. ORTOLAN, RkGLES INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATIE DE LA MER 252 (Paris 4th ed. 1864). A warship exercising
her right of reconnaissance may' not compel the vessel to show her colors. Should the
vessel refuse to identify herself, the warship may merely report the uncooperative vessel
to the proper authorities. R. Duuy & D. VIGNES, supra note 12, at 370; 1 G. GIDEL,
supra note 11, at 289-90; van der Mensbrugghe, supra note 17, at 61.
21. 1 G. GIDEL, supra note 11, at 290; Frangois, Regime of the High Seas, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/17, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. I.L.C. 36, 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1950/Add.1. But see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
22. The acceptance of the peacetime droit de visite has been gradual and controversial. The droit de visite was originally conceived as a belligerent right which did not
apply in time of peace. See supra note 14. Hyde is instructive:
The right to visit and search a foreign vessel on the high seas is regarded as pertaining to a belligerent as such, and hence a privilege which, in time of peace, no
State may justly exercise. That the existence of the right depends upon that also of
a state of war does not seem to be due to the belief that a State is deterred by any
rule of law from defending itself in seasons of peace by the same means which it
may employ when it is a belligerent. The true reason would appear to be that
what may be and usually is a frequent need of a belligerent, rarely, if ever, be-

1989]

FLAG-STATE JURISDICTION EXCEPTIONS

visit, is composed of two distinct operations. The first phase of the droit
de visite is the droit d'enqute du pavillion, or the right of investigation
of flag; the second phase is the right of search. When boarding is justified, the warship may visit the vessel to investigate her right to fly her
flag. Only circumstances of extreme suspicion, however, will justify a
search of the ship. 3 The droit d'enqute is, therefore, "part, indeed, but
a very small part, of the [droit devisite].' '24 The 1958 Convention on the
High Seas maintains this distinction:
In the cases [in which a ship is reasonably suspected of being engaged in
some proscribed activity], the warship may proceed to verify the ship's
right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of

comes a necessary mode of safeguarding the vessels of a State which is at peace.
1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 764 (footnotes omitted). For the views of United States
and English courts, see The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826); The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 119 (1825); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,
427 (1815); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 958 (1983); Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 245, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475-76 (1817).
Several early writers express similar concern over the assertion of a peacetime droit de
visite. See, e.g., 3 L. HAUTEFEUILLE, DES DROITS ET DES DEVOIRS DES NATIONS NEUTRES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE MARITIME 93-108 (Paris 2d ed. 1858); 1 J. ORTOLAN,
supra note 20, at 242, 258-62; see also Letter of Mr. John Adams, Secretary of State, to
Mr. Stratford Canning (Aug. 15, 1821), reprinted in 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 919-20 (1906) [hereinafter MOORE's DIGEST].
Eventually, states accepted a peacetime right of visit and search as a matter of custom
or treaty arrangement. Much remains, however, of the historical distaste for this right,
which is regarded today as a necessary evil; while states indeed acknowledge the right,
they do so grudgingly. Dupuy and Vignes warn, "Vritable atteinte au principe de
l'exclusivit6 de l'Etat du pavilion, les Etats ont 6 de tout temps hostile A la reconnaissance du droit de visite, meme dans un cadre conventionnel." R. DuPuY & D. VIGNES,
supra note 12, at 372. Halleck similarly observes that the assertion of a peacetime droit
de visite "upon the high seas is now universally regarded as a belligerent right which
cannot be exercised in time of peace, except when it has been conceded by treaty or
where there is suspicion of piracy or crime." 2 H. HALLECK, supra note 8, at 240. As
late as 1932, Gidel wrote that "le droit de 'visite' en temps de paix n'existe pas, sauf
exceptions strictement limites et risultant d'accords conventionnels." 1 G. GIDEL, supra
note 11, at 292.
23. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
24. 3 R. PHILLIMORE, supra note 14, at 523. Ortolan further distinguishes the two
phases of the droit de visite:
Independent of their goal, the two rights still differ considerably in the process or
means by wlich they are exercised.
The expression droit d'enqu~te du pavillon indicates a process more gentle, of
less direct means, the preliminary option for inquiring nationality, that is to say
for asking exhibition of the relevant signs.
1 J. ORTOLAN, supra note 20, at 234 (translation).
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an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents
have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the
ship ....

21

A warship may employ the droit d'enqute du pavillon-the first element of the comprehensive droit de visite-to ascertain or verify the true
nationality of a vessel she encounters uion the high seas. She may exercise her droit d'enqu~te against only those vessels she reasonably suspects of having engaged in some proscribed activity which, under customary or conventional law, would permit the warship to proceed
against the suspect vessel. 20 Furthermore, the droit d'enqu~te du pavilIon may attach whenever the warship possesses a "reasonable ground for
suspicion that the character of the ship is feigned."'2 7 Pursuant to this

25.

Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(2); see Convention on the

Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(2).

26. The High Seas Convention and the later Convention on the Law of the Sea
provide that before a warship visits a foreign merchantman on the high seas, there must
exist "reasonable ground for suspecting that" she has committed some proscribed activity.
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(1); Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(1). That a state must have "reasonable ground" to suspect an
infringement prevents the state from visiting a ship on the barest suspicion that she has
committed a delict. But the reasonable ground standard does not limit the availability of
the droit de visite to circumstances in which the warship has actual knowledge of an
infringement. The appropriate standard, therefore, lies somewhere between mere suspicion and actual knowledge. Because the propriety of any particular exercise of the droit
de visite relies on the factual milieu out of which the visitation arose, it is probably not
possible-nor indeed prudent-to be more precise than this. See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Crews, 605 F. Supp.
730 (S.D. Fla. 1985), affid sub noma.
United States v. McGill, 800 F.2d 265 (11th Cir.
1986).
27. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 312. There is ample support for this assertion.
Oppenheim observes:
It is a universally recognised customary rule of International Law that men-of-war
of all nations, in order to maintain the safety of the open sea against piracy, have
the power to require suspicious private vessels on the open sea to show their flag.
But such vessels must be suspicious. Since a suspicious vessel may still be a pirate
although she shows a flag, she may further be stopped and visited for the purpose
of inspecting her papers and thereby verifying the flag.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 266(2) (footnote omitted); see also I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 4, at 248-49; 1 J. ORTOLAN, supra note 20, at 252-55. Accordingly, a warship may visit a vessel of dubious identity regardless of whether she is suspected of
piracy, slave trading, or any other customary or conventional exception to the exclusivity
rule-dubious identity is sufficient cause. Dupuis writes, "L'enquEte du pavilion, si elle
est motivfe A la fois par des srieux motifs de douter de la nationalitE du navire rencontrE
et par l'intrir& de la sfcurit6 de la navigation, n'est pas une infraction au droit des gens;
elles n'est pas une offense envers l'Etat dont Ienavire a droit de porter le pavilion."
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right, the investigating warship seeks to
ascertain whether a merchant vessel is justly entitled to the protection of
the flag which she may happen to have hoisted, such vessel being in cir-

Dupuis, Libert des voles de communications relations internationales,2 RECUEIL DES
COURS 125, 145 (1924).
One can imagine how the exercise of the normally benign right of simple reconnaissance could easily ripen into a proper visitation and search. For example, a warship
approaches a ship on the high seas and requests that she identify herself. The ship responds in a suspicious manner, taking evasive action or refusing to fly a flag. It is true
that a ship on the high seas is not, in strictojure, obliged to await visitation nor even to
identify herself. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826); 2 H. HALLECK, supra note 8, at 242; 2 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 22, at 137; 20'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 647; 1 J. ORTOLAN, supra note 20, at 250-52.
Such behavior, however, is often sufficiently suspicious per se to justify boarding. Halleck
reminds us that
the United States Government, without distinctly recognising the right of a vessel
of war to compel a merchant vessel to display [her] colours, declared that the simple fact of refusing to exhibit colours was so high a ground of suspicion that it
might seem to sanction boarding and further inquiry, and that even if such inquiry
were not justified by the result the Government of the United States would not
demand redress for an act of visit executed under such circumstances.
2 H. HALLECK, supra note 8, at 251; see also C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 312 ("It
may happen that the vessel which it is desired to approach may prove obstinate and
refuse to hoist her flag. She at once becomes suspect.").
A recent case illuminates this possibility. In United States v. Alvarez-Mena, a United
States Coast Guard cutter approached a vessel on the high seas and requested that she
identify herself. The vessel flew no flag, had no stern markings indicating a home port,
and engaged in evasive maneuvers upon the cutter's approach. When the cutter requested
that she show her colors, the vessel responded by flying the Honduran flag-upside
down. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the cutter possessed
a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the seizure of the vessel. 765 F.2d 1259 (5th
Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, 1948 App. Cas.
351 (P.C.) (vessel seized after hoisting two flags, one of which signified no recognized
state). Hence, while a merchantman is not strictly obligated to show colors to an approaching warship, nor indeed to accomodate the warship in any way, failure to do so
may render the merchantman suspicious and therefore amenable to seizure. Smith, however, warns:
Provided that the merchant vessel responds by showing her flag the captain of the
warship is not justified in boarding her or taking any further action, unless there
is reasonable ground for suspecting that she is engaged in piracy or some other
improper activity. . . . If the vessel approached shows a foreign flag even suspicious conduct will not justify active interference except in those cases, such as slave
trading, where it is authorised by treaty. Otherwise the captain should merely
report the incident to superior authority so that further action, if deemed necessary, may be taken through diplomatic channels.
H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 64-65.
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cumstances which render her liable to the suspicion, first, that she is not
entitled to the protection of the flag; and, secondly, that if not entitled to it,
she is [by treaty] subject to the supervision and search of . . . cruisers.28

It follows that "a vessel may, under extraordinary circumstances of grave
suspicion, be visited in time of peace upon the high seas; for how otherwise could it be ascertained whether or no she carried the proper papers
on board? Or for what purpose, if she may not be visited, is she to carry
29
them?"
A suspicious vessel may be brought to on the high seas by the public
vessels 30 of any state authorized to proceed against the suspect vessel
under customary or conventional law. To effect a stoppage, the warship
will hail the suspect vessel or, if this is impossible or ineffectual, fire
across her bow. 1 Should the suspect vessel prove obstinate, the warship
may use reasonable force.32 The actual verification of flag takes place

28. Letter of Mr. Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Mr. Everett (Mar. 28,
1843), reprinted in 3 F. WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 137 (2d ed. 1887) [hereinafter WHARTON'S DIGEST].
29. 3 R. PHILLIMORE, supra note 14, at 523; see also H. SMITH, supra note 18, at
64.
30. Aircraft may undertake visitation under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(4). The public ships of a
foreign state, so long as they maintain that character, may not be stopped even when
reasonably suspected of having engaged in some proscribed activity. Id. arts. 95 (providing for immunity of warships on the high seas), 96 (providing for immunity of ships used
only on government noncommercial service); Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6,
arts. 8(1), 9.
31. Ortolan describes the procedure:
[A] merchantman which encounters a warship on the sea quickly hoists the flag.
However, in strictojure, nothing obliges her to show her flag first. If the warship
shows her colors, it is on her part a warning given to the other that she make
known, by showing her own, the nation to whom she belongs. This warning is
supported when necessary by a blank cannon shot and, in case of obstinate refusal,
by another cannon shot without a ball.
1 J. ORTOLAN, supra note 20, at 252-53 (translation). Oppenheim expresses himself
along similar lines, although he points out that the warship may resort to force if notice
is not taken of the "informing gun." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, §§ 267-68; see also
R. Dupuy & D. VIGNES, supra note 12, at 371.
32. The right to use force against a vessel refusing to submit to boarding is coextensive with the droit de visite. That is, the "right to stop a foreign vessel and visit her must
carry the right to use the requisite force, if the exercise of the right is resisted. If not, it is
not a right in any sense worth disputing." H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 n.89 (R. Dana 8th ed. 1866) (G. Wilson rev. ed. 1936) (Dana's note).
Colombos warns, however, that "the use of force in time of peace must not be abused and
is only permitted as a last extremity. Even in such a case, the forcible steps taken must
not exceed the immediate necessity, as otherwise a naval commander may involve by his
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aboard the suspect vessel." The warship will send a boarding party
under the command of an officer to the suspect vessel.34 Once aboard, the
boarding party will examine the papers and documentation of the suspect vessel. If the ship's papers are in order and the exercise of the droit
d'enqu~te du pavillon has discharged the original suspicions of the warship, the warship will allow the merchantman to go on her way. 5
If the exercise of the droit d'enqugte du pavillon fails to discharge the
suspicion of the warship that the merchantman is engaged in some proscribed activity, the warship may proceed to the second phase of the
droit de visite: the right of search. 6 The object of the search is the dis-

action the responsibility of his State." C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 313.
The use of force must be tempered by reason in light of the circumstances. McDougal
and Burke write:
The primary determinants of reasonableness in assessing the lawfulness of the
measures taken would appear to relate both to the apparent grounds for taking
any enforcement action, i.e., the reasons for the suspicions of the vessel concerned,
and to the possibilities in alternative practicable methods for enforcement causing
less interference with navigation. Thus, responsibility ought to be imposed upon
the acting state if the bases for enforcement action do not appear on review to have
been sufficiently adequate or if other less burdensome enforcement techniques
were available and could have been practically utilized.
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 885-86 (1962).
33. Gidel, however, writes that this "examination of the ships papers may be made
on the investigating ship by sending an officer to the ship whose nationality it is verifying, or, on the contrary, in receiving on board an officer furnished with the papers of the
ship investigated." 1 G. GIDEL, supra note 11, at 290 (translation); see also 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 268 ("After the vessel has been brought to, either an officer is sent
on board for the purpose of inspecting her papers, or her master is ordered to bring his
ship's papers for inspection on board the man-of-war."). With respect, it does not seem
prudent to require an officer of the suspect ship to carry the vessel's papers to the warship for two reasons: first, the papers of a vessel should never be exposed to chance of
loss; and second, suspicion may remain after the papers are examined and it may be
necessary to proceed to the merchantman in order to search her. In all cases, then, a
warship exercising her droit de visite should do so aboard the suspect vessel. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(2); Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 7, art. 110(2).
34. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(2); Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(2).
35. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 268.
36. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(2); Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(2) ("If suspicion remains after the documents have
been checked, [the warship] may proceed to a further examination on board the
ship . . . ."). As drafted, the Convention on the Law of the Sea authorizes the warship
to search the suspect vessel if the original suspicion has not dissipated upon the exercise
of her droit d'enqute. That is, no further or greater suspicion must arise for the warship to proceed to a search. It seems evident that the warship may search if the original
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covery of evidence that would bear out the suspicions of the warship.
The right of search is, consequently, far more intrusive than the droit
d'enqu~te. Daniel Webster observes that the right of search
implies not only a right to inquire into the national character, but to detain the vessel, to stop the progress of the voyage, to examine papers, to
decide on their regularity and authenticity, and to make inquisition on
board ... into the business which the vessel is engaged in. In other words,

it describes the entire right of belligerent visitation and search.3"
The search must be exercised with due care. Oppenheim writes:
Search is effected by an officer and some of the crew of the man-of-war,
the master and crew of the vessel to be searched not being obliged to
render any assistance whatever, except to open locked cupboards and the
like. The search must take place in an orderly way, and no damage must
be done to the cargo. If the search proves everything to be in order, the
searching party must carefully replace everything removed, a memorandum of the search is to be made in the log-book, and the searched vessel is
to be allowed to proceed on her course.38
Upon the consummation of the search, either the suspicions of the
warship are borne out, or the vessel is found innocent. If the search
yields sufficient evidence that the vessel has indeed engaged in proscribed
activity, the warship may arrest the vessel or otherwise bring the vessel
to account. 9 If, however, the search proves fruitless, the flag-state of the
warship may be liable for any loss or damages sustained by the vessel as
a result of the visit and search."'
suspicion has dissipated and a new suspicion has arisen.
37.

Letter of Mr. Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to Mr. Everett (Mar. 28,

1843), reprinted in 3 WHARTON'S

DIGEST,

supra note 28, at 136.

38. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 269.
39. Oppenheim writes:
Arrest is effected through the commander of the arresting man-of-war appointing
one of her officers and a part of her crew to take charge of the arrested vessel.
This officer is responsible for the vessel, and for her cargo, which must be kept
safe and intact. The arrested vessel, either accompanied by the arresting vessel or
not, must be brought to such harbour as is determined by the cause of the arrest.
I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, § 270. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is
silent with respect to the arrest of vessels found to have engaged in a proscribed activity,
with the exception of "radio pirates." Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7,
art. 109(4); see infra part VII. The arresting state is obliged promptly to release the
vessel and her crew. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 292.
40. Liability for an unjustified visit and search is well-established. See 1 G. GIDEL,
supra note 11, at 298 ("Le navire saisissant agit a ses risques et prils."); 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW

173 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1977) ("The governing rule,
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III.

THE PIRACY EXCEPTION

A. Pirates Subject to UniversalJurisdiction
Piracy is an international crime. From ancient times, those who have
undertaken depredations upon the high seas have been subject to the universal condemnation of states. Anyone engaged in piracy is deemed hostis
41
humani generis-an enemy of all humanity.

with regard to verification and search by warships in time of peace, is still that any
interference by a man-of-war with a vessel flying the flag of a foreign country takes place
at the risk and subject to the strict accountability of the State to which the warship in
question belongs."); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 266(2) ("[T]he home State is
responsible in damages in case a man-of-war stops and visits a foreign merchantman
without sufficient ground for suspicion."); 3 R. PHILLIMORE, supra note 14, at 525
("[A]II proceeding beyond the exchange of hailing and signals, must be taken at the risk
of the man-of-war who visits.") (footnote omitted).
Liability will attach if the suspicions of the warship prove unjustified, provided the
suspect vessel did nothing to raise the suspicion of the warship. The 1958 Convention on
the High Seas provides that "[i]f the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that
the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for
any loss or damage that may have been sustained." Convention on the High Seas, supra
note 6, art. 22(3); see Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(3).
Liability, therefore, does not flow merely from visits that are fruitless, but from visits
that are truly unjustified.
This notion of fault liability apparently followed from a suggestion of Yugoslavia to
the International Law Commission that "search of merchant ships by warships should
not be discouraged by too strict sanctions. It is necessary therefore to consider whether a
provision should be inserted freeing the warship from damnam emergens, if dolus or
culpa lata cannot be charged to the warship." Regime of the High Seas and Regime of
the Territorial Sea, Comments by Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/99/Add. 1, reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. I.L.C. 1, 97, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.11 (comment of Yugoslavia). The inclusion of the above-quoted provision in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas was likely, at that time, a progressive development. Prior to 1958,
state practice and opinion supported strict liability for unjustified searches. See, e.g., The
Wanderer (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 68, 69 (1921); The Jessie (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6
R.I.A.A. 57, 57 (1921) (United States liable for wrongful search "notwithstanding the
good faith of the naval authorities"); see also 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra, at 173. But
see The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826) (warship not liable for boarding
a private vessel after mistaking her for a pirate).
Curiously, a visit unjustified ab initio may be justified after the fact if sufficient evidence of the vessel's guilt is uncovered upon visitation and search. Gidel writes, "S'il
prouve le d~lit commis par l'autre navire, son attitude se trouve l6gitime." 1 G. GIDEL,
supra note 11, at 290; see also Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) at 42.
41. That piracy is an international crime may be taken as a general axiom of international law. There exists universal, unequivocal support for this proposition. As early
as 1688, Sir Leoline Jenkins observed, "All pirates and sea rovers are outlawed, as I may
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Pirates, being the enemies of all states, enjoy the protection of no state.
Judge Moore, dissenting in the Lotus case, explains:
[I]n the case of what is known as piracy by law of nations, there has been
conceded a universal jurisdiction, under which the person charged with
the offence may be tried and punished by any nation into whose jurisdiction he may come ....
Piracy by law of nations, in its jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis.
Though statutes may provide for its punishment, it is an offence against
the law of nations; and as the scene of the pirate's operations is the high
seas, which it is not the right or duty of any nation to police, he is denied
the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is treated as an outlaw,
as the enemy of all mankind-hostis humani generis-whom any nation
may in the interest of all capture and punish.4 2
Hence, any ship engaged in acts of piracy is, for jurisdictional purposes,
"stateless." The flag-state of a pirate vessel does not possess exclusive
jurisdiction over her; rather, such a vessel is subject to universal
jurisdiction.42
say, by the law of nations .

" 1 W. WYNNE, THE LIFE OF SIR LEOLINE JENKINS 86
(1724), quoted in 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 967 n.234. Later
writers echo Sir Leoline's words. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 311; C.
COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 443-44 ("The act of piracy, being one against the whole
body of civilised States, is often described as an 'international crime,' whilst the pirate
himself is generally referred to as hostis humani generis, the enemy of the human
race."); I C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 768; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note
4, at 967; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 272; H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 65 ("By
the ancient custom of the sea all honest men are entitled to treat the pirate as an outlaw,
an Ishmaelite, and a general enemy of mankind."); H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at
162.
Lest the reader think this discussion somewhat anachronistic, I hasten to point out that
piracy remains to this day an active and serious impediment to the international regime
of the high seas. See generally Ellen, Piracy, in VIOLENCE AT SEA 225 (B. Parritt ed.
1986); Kime & Sheehan, Violence at Sea: Scope of the Problem, in THE LAW OF THE
SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 419 (T. Clingan ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHAT LIES AHEAD?].

42. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 70
(Moore, J., dissenting); see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162-63
(1820); Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 244,164 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475 (1817) ("With professed
pirates there is no state of peace. They are the enemies of every country, and at all times;
and therefore are universally subject to the extreme rights of war.").
43. This is not to say that a pirate vessel is stripped of her flag. Rather, the pirate
vessel merely loses the protection of that flag. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea provides that a "ship ...may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate
ship ....The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from
which such nationality was derived." Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7,
art. 104; see Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 18; see also I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 272; 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 650
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A ship engaged in piracy is ipso facto under the protection of no state,
rendering all states competent to stop, search, and arrest a suspected pirate vessel."' This exception to the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction is perhaps the most firmly-rooted of all exceptions.45 Indeed, not
merely are states entitled to arrest pirate vessels encountered upon the
high seas, they are obliged to do so.46 The 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea codifies the piracy exception and provides that any state that
encounters a pirate vessel on the high seas is competent to board,47

(1965) [hereinafter WHITEMAN'S DIGEST]; van Zwanenberg, Interference with Ships on
the High Seas, 10 I.C.L.Q. 785, 805 (1961). But see 1 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 182 (2d ed. 1910) ("There is . . .no state flag in the case [of piracy]. If the
piratical ship was ever entitled to carry one, her title to do so has been withdrawn.").
44. Wheaton observes, "Pirates being the common enemies of all mankind, and all
nations having an equal interest in their apprehension and punishment, they may be
lawfully captured on the high seas by the armed vessels of any particular State, and
brought within its territorial jurisdiction, for trial in its tribunals." H. WHEATON, supra
note 32, at 162 (footnote omitted).
Dana, in a footnote to Wheaton's comment, notes, "It is true, that a pirate jure gentium can be seized and tried by any nation, irrespective of his national character, or of
that of the vessel on board which, against which, or from which, the act was done. The
reason of this must be, that the act is one over which all nations have equal jurisdiction."
Id. at 163 n.83.
Oppenheim is in accord, writing:
Before International Law in the modern sense of the term was in existence, a
pirate was already considered an outlaw, a "hostis humani generis." According to
the Law of Nations the act of piracy makes the pirate lose the protection of his
home State, and thereby his national character; and his vessel, although she may
formerly have possessed a claim to sail under a certain State's flag, loses such
claim. Piracy is a so-called "international crime"; the pirate is considered the enemy of every State, and can be brought to justice anywhere.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 272 (footnote omitted); see also J. BRIERLY, supra
note 4, at 311 ("Under an ancient rule of maritime law, pirates are offenders against the
law of nations, hostes humani generis, who may be arrested on the high seas by the
warships of any state and brought into port for trial together with their ship."); D.
GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (2d ed. 1976); 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 768; M.
McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 876; 20'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 4, at 658; 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 967, 977;
1 R. PHILLIMORE, supra note 14, at 488; H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 68; 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 182.
45. M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (2d ed. 1986).
46. The Convention on the Law of the Sea provides, "All States shall co-operate to
the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other
place outside the jurisdiction of any State." Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 7, art. 100; see Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 14.
47. The relevant article provides in pertinent part, "[A] warship which encounters
on the high seas a foreign ship .. is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasona-
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search,48 and arrest her.4
B.

Piracy Jure Gentium Defined

The right to proceed against a pirate vessel and those aboard her exists only in the case of piracy jure gentium-piracy as defined by the
law of nations. While the municipal law of a state may purport to define
piracy, such parochial legislation is ineffective beyond the borders of the
state; on the high seas, a state may proceed against a vessel on the
grounds that she is a pirate under its law only to the extent that its law
duplicates the law of nations. 50
Although several writers acknowledge that it is no simple matter to
define piracy jure gentium,5 ' the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea nevertheless attempts to put into black letter the following definition
of piracy jure gentium in article 101:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence, detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
..., and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship ..

. ,

or against persons or

property on board such ship... ;
(ii) against a ship . . . , persons or property in a place outside the

jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship ... with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship... ;

ble ground for suspecting that.., the ship is engaged in piracy . .

" Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(1)(a); see Convention on the High Seas, supra
note 6, art. 22(1)(a).
48. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(2); see Convention on
the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(2).
49. The pertinent provision stipulates:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every
State may seize a pirate ship ..., or a ship.., taken by piracy and under the
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The
courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to
be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships
•.. subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 105; see Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 6, art. 19. This article preserves the ancient maxim pirata non mutat
dorninium-piracy does not change ownership. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, §
279.
50. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 280.
51. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 312; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 244;
20'CONNELL, LAW OF

THE SEA,

supra note 4, at 966.
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(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in

sub-paragraph (a) or (b).

2

The Convention subsequently defines a "pirate ship" as a ship "intended
by the persons in dominant control to. be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the
ship . . . has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains
53
under the control of the persons guilty of that act."
Several writers express concern that article 101 inadequately captures
the customary definition of piracy jure gentium.5 4 Article 101 restates,
without substantive modification, article 15 of the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas-a provision intended to be "generally declaratory of established principles of international law."5 5 Discussion of the draft of
article 15 evinced uncertainty regarding that provision's accuracy. 6 Still,
any inquiry into the nature of piracy jure gentium must begin with these
two provisions, the constituent elements of which are examined below.
1.

Acts of Piracy

The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea refers to piratical acts as
"any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation.""

This provision rejects the traditional notion that acts of piracy are limited to those acts committed with an animusfurandi-anintent to plunder. 8 The Convention instead sets out a definition of piracy jure gen-

52. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 101; see Convention on the
High Seas, supra note 6, art. 15.
53. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 103; see Convention on the
High Seas, supra note 6, art. 17.
54. O'Connell, for example, writes in reference to the corresponding provision of the
earlier Convention on the High Seas: "Because of its elliptical nature, Article 15 is one
of the least successful essays in codification of the Law of the Sea, and the question is
open whether it is comprehensive so as to preclude reliance upon customary law, where
this may differ, or has superseded customary law." 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA,
supra note 4, at 970.
55. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, preamble; see Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 2,
28, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. I.L.C. 253, 260-61, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 [hereinafter 1956 Report of the I.L.C.].
56. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 448; D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 329 ("The
discussions on the various drafts drawn up by the International Law Commission concerning the law of the sea showed wide disagreement on the nature of piratical acts.").
For a helpful survey of the debates of the I.L.C. on the definition of piracy, see B.
DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 104-23 (1980).
57. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 101(a).
58. Previously, an intent to plunder was thought necessary to the commission of
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tium that is broad enough to encompass any illegal acts of violence,
detention, or depredation and not merely those delicts committed with an
intent to plunder. 59 The view that piracy need not necessarily be attended by an animus furandi has historical support. Dana observed in
the last century:
It has sometimes been said, that the act [of piracy] must be done lucri
causti, and the English common-law definition of animus furandi has
been treated as a requisite; but the motive may be gratuitous malice, or

the purpose may be to destroy, in private revenge for real or supposed
injuries done by persons, or classes of persons, or by a particular national
authority.6"
Acts of piracy jure gentium therefore consist of "violence upon the high
seas . . . that may or may not involve animus furandi."61
By refusing to limit the definition of piracy to mere acts of plunder,
the Convention implicitly acknowledges that no particular course of conduct is piratical. Rather, the Convention describes piracy as "essentially
a continuous crime, and overt acts of violence are merely evidence of the
piratical character."'6 2 Piracy is a state of being; piratical acts are manifestations of that unlawful condition. Accordingly, piracy is distinguishable from criminal acts committed on the high seas. Pirates commit crimi-

piracy. Justice Story, writing in 1820, observed that "all writers concur, in holding, that
robbery, or forcible depredations upon the sea, animofurandi,is piracy." United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820); see also 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, §
272.
59. In adopting this broad definition, the Convention on the Law of the Sea rejects
article 3 of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Piracy, which defines piracy as
"[a]ny act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property." Harvard
Research Draft Convention on Piracy, art. 3, reprinted in 26 A.J.I.L. 739, 768-69
(Supp. 1932). The I.L.C. adopted this provision verbatim. Frangois, Regime of the High
Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/79 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. I.L.C. 7, 15-16, U.N.
Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/Add.1. The English Privy Council, in 1934, supported this
broader definition, observing that "[a] careful examination of the subject [of piracy]
shows a gradual widening of the earlier definition of piracy to bring it from time to time
more in consonance with situations either not thought of or not in existence when the
older jurisconsults were expressing their opinions." In re Piracy Jure Gentium, 1934
App. Cas. 586, 600 (P.C.).
60. H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 163 n.83 (Dana's note); see 1 C. HYDE, supra
note 14, at 772 ("As piracy does not necessarily involve the taking of property, the absence of an intent to steal is not necessarily decisive of the character of what takes
place.").
61. 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 969.
62. H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 66.
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nal acts at sea, but the commission of a crime at sea does not make one a
pirate; criminal acts are offenses against a particular state, whereas
piracy is an offense against the law of nations."3
In sum, piratical acts are acts of. violence, detention, or deprivation
that evince a general lawlessness, that affect the interests of all law-abiding states, and that render one who commits such acts-properly speaking-the common enemy of all mankind.

63.

O'Connell asks rhetorically:

What is the common element which links the several listed acts of violence, detention or depredation together in the one category? Put negatively by John Marshall
in a Speech in the House of Representatives piracy is
any act which denotes this universal hostility ....

Not only an actual rob-

bery therefore, but cruising on the high seas without commission, and with
intent to rob, is piracy. This is an offense against all and every nation, and
is therefore alike punishable by all. But an offense which in its nature affects only a particular nation is only punishable by that nation.
This test, that the offence in its nature affects more than a particular nation, en.ables one to propose that violence not amounting to theft or involving the intention
to commit theft may be piracy, and that something more than a single murder on a
national ship is necessary to constitute violence in this sense.

2

O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 4, at 659 (footnotes omitted).

Smith agrees with O'Connell that acts which do not affect more than one state are
incapable of classification as piracy jure gentium: "Robbery, kidnapping, and murder
constitute the normal evidence of piratical character, but these crimes do not by themselves become acts of piracy merely because they are committed at sea. In all ordinary
cases a crime committed on board ship is nothing more than an offence against the law of
the flag State." H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 67.
Actions that do not affect states other than the flag-state, except in the most attenuated
fashion, cannot therefore be deemed piratical. The reasoning behind this proposition is
straightforward. Recall that a pirate is the universal enemy of all humanity and, for this
reason, is subject to the extreme sanction of the universal jurisdiction of states. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text. One who offends the laws of a single state is not properly a "universal enemy of all mankind." The imperative that this label connotes simply
does not arise vis-a-vis one who, for example, commits a single murder aboard a ship on
the high seas. The law of the flag-state is sufficient to deal with the shipboard murderer.
The conclusion is very different, however, in the case of one who engages in lawless
behavior that threatens the shipping of several states and menaces international commerce. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820) (murder is an offense against the laws of the state, whereas piracy is an offense against mankind). The
offense must be against the international order itself, not merely against the laws of a
single state, for the offense to be deemed piratical jure gentium.
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Private Ends

Under the article 101 definition of piracy, the illegal acts of violence,
detention, or depredation must be "committed for private ends."" This
"private ends" requirement renders non-piractical acts committed in furtherance of some putative non-private-that is to say, public or political-purpose.6 5 This definition, consequently, excludes acts of violence,
detention, or depredation committed by insurgents who take to the high
seas in connection with their rebellion. Such an exclusion squares with
existing custom; states are historically reluctant to deem insurgents pirates-provided the insurgents reasonably tailor their activities to their
political objective.6" Depredations unrelated to an insurgency may be de-

64. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 101(a).
65. In favor of the proposition that insurgents may not be deemed pirates except
insofar as their activities are unconnected with their rebellion, see J. BRIERLY, supra
note 4, at 313; I. BROWNLIE supra note 4, at 246; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 273
("It must be emphasised that the motive and the purpose of such [insurgent] acts of
violence do not alter their piratical character, since the intent to plunder (animus
furandi) is not required.").
66. In the early English case of the Magellan Pirates, Dr. Lushington held:
It is true that where the subjects of one country may rebel against the ruling
power, and commit divers acts of violence with regard to that ruling power, that
other nations may not think fit to consider them as acts of piracy. But however this
may be, I do not think it necessary to follow up that disquisition on the present
occasion. I think it does not follow that, because persons who are rebels or insurgents may commit against the ruling power of their own country acts of violence,
they may not be, as well as insurgents and rebels, pirates also; pirates for other
acts committed towards other persons. It does not follow that rebels or insurgents
may not commit piratical acts against the subjects of other states, especially if such
acts were in no degree connected with the insurrection or rebellion.
The Magellan Pirates, 1 Sp. Ecc. & Ad. 81, 83, 164 Eng. Rep. 47, 48 (1853).
State practice has followed Dr. Lushington. In 1887, for example, Great Britain and
Peru agreed to treat as a pirate the insurgent vessel Huascar, which had stopped a
British vessel on the high seas, taking coal and two hostages. That same year, Cuban
insurgents commandeered the Spanish vessel Montezuma in furtherance of the Cuban
revolt against Spain. Brazil refused to treat the insurgents as pirates because the Montezuma had restricted its scope of operation to Spanish targets. See C. COLOMBOS, supra
note 9, at 451-52; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 975-76; 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 273; 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 184-85; van
Zwanenberg, supra note 43, at 809.
Somewhat anomalous, however, is the early United States case of The Ambrose Light,
in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held,
without qualification, that "recognition by at least some established government of a
'state of war,' or of the belligerent rights of insurgents, is necessary to prevent their
cruisers from being held legally piratical by the courts of other nations injuriously affected." The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1885). The Ambrose Light is, for
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fined properly as private ergo piratical.6 7 Even if insurgents may not be
all intents and purposes, no longer good precedent in United States courtrooms insofar as
the United States has admitted that "[tihe question whether a vessel in the hands of
insurgents is piratical depends upon its actions, that is, whether it confines itself to depredations against its own country or commits depredations against vessels of other countries." Statement of the Solicitor for the United States Department of State (Aug. 16,
1929), reprinted in .2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 697 (1941)
[hereinafter HACKWORTH'S DIGEST]. On The Ambrose Light, see C. COLOMBOS, supra
note 9, at 451-52; D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 330; 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 774;
2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 976; 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43,
at 184; Green, The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates,37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 496, 501-03

(1961); van Zwanenberg, supra note 43, at 810-11.
More recent incidents are likewise aligned with Dr. Lushington's proposition that insurgents shall not be deemed pirates so long as they reasonably comport their activities to
the furtherance of their revolt. In 1961, the Portuguese liner Santa Maria was seized by
a group of passengers opposed to the Governments of Portugal and Spain. This group
killed one crew member and held hostage 560 passengers for eleven days. The Portuguese Government obtained the assistance of the United States in bringing the takers of
the Santa Maria to justice.
Initially, both the United States and Portugal expressed the view that the Santa Maria ought to be treated as a pirate. The United States, however, softened its position once
the Santa Maria was safely returned. McDougal and Burke observe that "[tihe principle
significance of these events in clarification of the law of piracy lies, clearly, in the recognition by the interested states ... that this seizure by violence was not, because of the
political objectives of the actors, a case of piracy." M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra
note 32, at 822. On the Santa Maria incident, see J. BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 312-13;
C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 445-46; D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 331-32; Green,
supra; van Zwanenberg, supra note 43, at 798-801.
A similar incident arose in 1985 when four members of the Palestinian Liberation
Front seized the Italian liner Achille Lauro. The four Palestinians, who boarded as
passengers, sought the release of fifty of their compatriots held in Israel. Over four hundred passengers and crew were held hostage for three days. One passenger was killed.
Egypt eventually agreed to provide the Palestinians with safe passage and the liner was
returned.
However one may wish to classify their actions, the takers of the Achille Lauro were
not acting to secure some private end. Accordingly, the taking of the Achille Lauro
would not likely fall within the article 101 definition of piracy. In any event, the Achille
Lauro incident-like the Santa Maria incident-involved only one ship, making the
action non-piratical by operation of the so-called two-ship rule, which is discussed below.
See infra part III, section B.4. On the Achille Lauro incident, see Gooding, Fighting
Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J.
INT'L L. 158 (1987); McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implicationsfor International Law, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691 (1985); Note, Towards a New Definition of Piracy:
The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723 (1986).

67. Brierly observes that "[a]lthough it has long been the practice of outside states
not to treat insurgents as pirates provided that they do not interfere with foreign vessels,
that has not always been the case when they have operated against foreign vessels." J.
BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 312. Brownlie, citing the 1928 Convention on the Rights and

1186

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

I'Vol 22.1161

classified as pirates, state law may hold those who revolt against the state
accountable for their actions. 8
3.

Private Ship

Piracy jure gentium, as defined by article 101 of the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, consists of unlawful acts committed "by the crew
or the passengers of a private ship."69 This definition, taken literally,
leads to the conclusion that the public vessels of a state are incapable of
classification as pirates."0 This provision must, however, be read alongside article 102, which provides that "[t]he acts of piracy, as defined in
article 101, committed by a warship [or] government ship . . . whose
crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship

. . .

are assimilated to

acts committed by a private ship. 11' Hence, under the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, a public vessel under discipline cannot commit acts of
piracy, whereas a mutinied ship may so act.

Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife, warns that "it may be that it is lawful to
punish acts constituting mala prohibita-murder, robbery, and so on-carried out ultra
vires by insurgents." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 246 & n.4. Colombos is of a similar
mind:
If a warship rebels and confines her attentions solely to political acts done for
political ends against the State towards which she is in revolt, principle and practice require such ship to be left unmolested by the ships of war of other States. She
should not be treated as a pirate so long as no acts of violence are committed
against others than the Government party against which the insurrection is
directed.
C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 450. Green writes, "[I]nsurgents, if they were to be
treated as pirates, would have to commit some predatory act against the nationals of third
States or their property, which acts would need primafacieto be unconnected with the
political activities of the rebel group." Green, supra note 66, at 501; see also 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (1947) ("The great majority of
writers are of the view that ships of unrecognized insurgents which do not confine their
activities to their own State are and may be treated as piratical.").
68. J. BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 313-14 ("Naturally, the exclusion of these acts
from being considered criminal acts of piracy under international law does not in any
way relieve the persons concerned of any criminal liability which may attach to them in
respect of these acts under the law of the flag state or of the state whose nationals they
may be.").
69. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 101(a).
70. The International Law Commission, the body responsible for the draft that eventually became the Convention on the High Seas, asserts that "piracy can be committed
only by private ships and not by warships or other government ships." 1956 Report of
the I.L.C., supra note 55, art. 39, comment (1)(iii), at 28, [1956] 2 Y.B. I.L.C. at 282;
see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
71. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 102.
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This "private ship" requirement is innovative. Prior to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas-the relevant provisions of which the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea largely restates 2-"it was taken for
granted that commissioned vessels under discipline could be guilty of
piracy."' 3 Dr. Lushington wrote in 1853 that, "even an independent
state may, in my opinion, be guilty of piratical acts." 4 Oppenheim observes that the definition of piracy jure gentium may be applicable "to
vessels which, though acting under orders of a recognised Government,
commit acts which are in gross breach of International Law and which
show a criminal disregard of human life." ' Given the long history of
support for the notion that public vessels under discipline might be guilty
of piracy, it is understandable that the exclusion of such a stipulation
from the 1958 Convention on the High Seas definition of piracy pro-

72.

See supra note 7.

73. 2

O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA,

supra note 4, at 974.

74. The Magellan Pirates, 1 Sp. Ecc. & Ad. 81, 83, 164 Eng. Rep. 47, 48 (1853).
The statement was, however, a dictum.
75. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 273(a) (footnote omitted). Oppenheim cites as
support for his position the 1937 Nyon Arrangement, pursuant to which acts of unrestricted submarine warfare were declared "contrary to the most elementary dictates of
humanity [and] should be justly treated as acts of piracy." The Nyon Arrangement, done
Sept. 14, 1937, preamble, 181 L.N.T.S. 135, 137. The principles of the Nyon Arrangement, however, gained little support outside that regime and are not deemed declaratory
of a general axiom of public international law. Indeed, the principles of the Nyon Arrangement were expressly rejected by the International Law Commission, which was of
the opinion that
such treaties [as the Nyon Arrangement] do not invalidate the principle that piracy
can only be committed by private ships. In view of the immunity from interference
by other ships which warships are entitled to claim, the seizure of such ships on
suspicion of piracy might involve the gravest consequences. Hence the Commission
feels that to assimilate unlawful acts committed by warships to acts of piracy
would be prejudicial to the interests of the international community. The Commission was unable to share the view held by some of its members that the principle
laid down in the Nyon Arrangement confirmed a new law in process of development. In particular, the questions arising in connexion with acts committed by
warships in the service of rival Governments engaged in civil war are too complex
to make it seem necessary for the safeguarding of order and security on the high
seas that all States should have a general right, let alone an obligation, to repress
as piracy acts perpetrated by the warships of the parties in question.
1956 Report of the I.L.C., supra note 55, art. 39, comment (2), at 28, [1956] 2 Y.B.
I.L.C. at 282. Oppenheim himself admits in an earlier passage that "private vessels only
can commit piracy." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 273; see also C. COLOMBOS,
supra note 9, at 446; Comment, The Nyon Arrangements, 19 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 198
(1938).
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yoked some small controversy. 6
In the final analysis, state practice and good sense support the principle that public ships under discipline may not be guilty of piracy. A
public vessel under commission does not fit the traditional image of the
lawless, freebooting pirate vessel for the simple reason that the commissioned vessel-unlike the pirate-may be held strictly accountable to her
flag-state. This accountability also explains why mutiny transforms a
commissioned vessel into a vessel capable of acts of piracy. O'Connell
writes:
The supposition that officers and crew of a commissioned ship cannot
commit piracy unless they overthrow their own authority ... seems, however, correct in principle since the commissioned vessel's State may be held
internationally responsible. The connotation of pirates as hostes humani
generis presupposes an absence of State responsibility for them."
Hence, so long as a public vessel remains accountable to a state, there is
no justification for subjecting her to the universal jurisdiction of states by
labelling her a piraite.
4.

Against Another Ship

The definition of piracy set forth in the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea incorporates the so-called "two-ship" rule, which provides
that acts of violence and depredation upon the high seas are not piratical
unless directed by one ship against another ship or ships7 Hence, acts
taken by the passengers or crew of a ship against the ship itself or
against its property are not piratical.
The two-ship rule is controversial because it forecloses the consideration of mutiny as piracy. Prior to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,
the precursor of the 1982 Convention, it was a foregone conclusion that
76. The Soviet Union commented at the time, "The International Law Commission's
decision to restrict the concept of piracy to acts of piracy committed by private ships...
for private ends [is] contrary to the practice and theory of international law." 11 U.N.
GAOR 0.6 (488th mtg.) at 37, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.488 (1956).
77. 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 974-75. Oppenheim writes:
It is widely believed that a man-of-war or other public ship under the orders of a
recognised government or belligerent, so long as she remains such, is not a pirate,
and that if she commits unjustified acts of violence redress must be asked from her
flag State, which has to punish the commander, and to pay damages where required. In any case if a man-of-war or other public ship of a State revolts, and
cruises the sea for her own purposes, she ceases to be a public ship, and acts of
violence then committed by her are indeed piratical acts.
I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 273 (footnote omitted).
78. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 101(a)(i).
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mutineers could be guilty of piracy. Oppenheim writes, "If the crew, or
passengers, revolt on the open sea and convert the vessel and her goods to
their own use, they commit piracy, whether the vessel is private or public." 79 The Law of the Sea Convention purports to change this
supposition."0
The two-ship rule has some support in state practice,"' but the matter
remains uncertain. While mutiny per se is nevertheless non-piratical
under the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, a mutinied ship may become piratical if "the mutineers, when they have gained control, then proceed to
use the ship for criminal purposes. In other words, there is no piracy
unless a ship itself is made the instrument or vehicle of crime."" 2
5. On the High Seas
The final element in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea definition of piracy requires that acts of piracy occur "on the high seas ' 8 3 or
"in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State."84 This requirement is

79.

1 L.

OPPENHEIM,

note 11, at 323; W.

supra note 4, § 274. For imilar views, see 1 G.

HALL,

A TREATISE ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW

GIDEL,

supra

257 (J. Atlay 6th ed.

1909); 1 J. ORTOLAN, supra note 20, at 214; van Zwanenberg, supra note 43, at 81415.
80. This is, however, not altogether clear from the wording of the provision.
O'Connell explains that paragraph 1(a) of article 15 of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas, which corresponds to article 101(a)(i) of the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea,
defines piracy by reference to acts directed against another ship, and if that is all
the Article said it would exclude internal seizure. But paragraph 1(b), in oracular
terms, defines piracy as acts "against a ship" in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State. If that is a reference to location, then "a ship" might mean "another
ship". But if it is not, then "a ship" might mean "the ship" and not "another
ship". In that case sub-paragraph (b) would not be redundant but it would make
the word "another" in sub-paragraph (a) redundant.
2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 970. O'Connell eventually concludes,
after making reference to the travaux pr~paratoires,that the "history indicates an intention to exclude internal seizure from the definition." Id. at 971.
81. As observed above, states and commentators do not regard the internal seizure of
the Santa Maria and the Achille Lauro as acts of piracy. See supra note 66.
82. H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 67. Accordingly, the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea provides, "[A]cts of piracy ... committed by a warship [or] government ship.
. . whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship ... are assimilated to acts
committed by a private ship . .. ." Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art.
102.
83. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 101(a)(i).
84. Id. art. 101(a)(ii).
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uncontroversial.85 All states may seize pirate ships encountered on the
high seas.8"
IV.

THE SLAVE TRADE EXCEPTION

A.

Evolution of the Right

The right of visitation and search of suspected slave traders has been
historically a conventional right only-a right nonexistent under customary law.8 7 The slave trade occupies a peculiar place in legal history;

85. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 244-45; C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 444;
D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 332-33; 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 767; M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 813-14; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 4, at 978.
86. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, arts. 105, 110(1)(a).
87. The well-known writers all agree that the slave trade exception is solely a conventional right. Wheaton remarks, "The African slave-trade, though prohibited by the
municipal laws of most nations ... is not such by the general international law; and its
interdiction cannot be enforced by the exercise of the ordinary right of visitation and
search. That right does not exist, in time of peace, independently of special compact." H.
WHEATON, supra note 32, at 165-68. Westlake observes that "for the detection and
suppression of the slave trade there is no right of visit and search by general law, but
only by treaty between states which have conceded it to one another in their just hatred
of that traffic, which, however abominable, has never been regarded as an international
offence." I J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 170. Hyde writes, "It is said that the law of
nations does not permit the visitation and search of foreign vessels in time of peace as a
means of suppressing the slave trade." 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 765; see also C.
CoLoMBos, supra note 9, at 457; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 340(h).
Early jurisprudence supports the proposition that the right to visit suspected slave
traders is a conventional right only. In The Antelope, the leading United States case on
the subject, Chief Justice Marshall held that the slave trade "has claimed all the sanction
which could be derived from long usage, and general acquiescence. That trade could not
be considered as contrary to the law of nations which was authorized and protected by
the laws of all commercial nations; the right to carry on which was claimed by each, and
allowed by each." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115 (1825). On the British
side, see Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 248-54, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1476-79 (1817); Madrazo
v. Willes, 3 B. & Aid. 353, 357, 359, 106 Eng. Rep. 692, 693-94 (1820).
The acceptance of the right to seize traders in slaves as only a conventional right was,
however, gradual and not without controversy. Great Britain, throughout the first half of
the nineteenth century, asserted a general customary right of visit and search for the
suppression of the slave trade. The assertion of this putative right met with loud protest
from the United States, sparking the so-called Visitation Controversy. Great Britain
eventually succumbed to United States protestations and abandoned the practice altogether. In response, Lord Lyndhurst proclaimed to the House of Lords, "[W]e have
surrendered no right, for . . . no right such as that which is contended for has ever
existed. We have ... abandoned the assumption of a right, and in doing so we have...

19891

FLAG-STATE JURISDICTION EXCEPTIONS

while the trade has been roundly condemned as inhuman"' and declared
illegal under the laws of several states,8 9 the general law of nations has
never proscribed the slave trade. International society abhors the trade
but international law tolerates it. 90 One may argue, however, that the
slave trade is today repugnant to customary international law. In any
event, the customary right of visit and search, historically speaking, did
not provide an effective legal mechanism for the abolition of the slave
trade.
States initially overcame the lack of customary measures enforceable
against slave traders by binding themselves to treaties that conceded a
reciprocal droit de visite. Pursuant to these treaties, one state would permit another to visit and search those ships of its merchant fleet suspected
of engaging in the slave trade. 9 Such treaties were opposable inter se
but did not, of course, affect the rights of third states, which remained
free to engage in this odious trade.92 Nevertheless, the limited conventional regimes established by these treaties proved extraordinarily effective against slave traders.9"
At the turn of the nineteenth century, states eagerly voiced their disapproval of the slave trade. In 1814, the United States and Great Britain
signed the Treaty of Ghent, which stipulated, inter alia, that each state

acted justly, prudently, and wisely." Statement of Lord Lyndhurst (July 26, 1858), reprinted in 2 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 22, at 945; see also Statement of Lord

Malmesbury, reprinted in 2 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 22, at 945. For a full account of the Visitation Controversy, see 2 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 22, at 914-51; 3
R. PHILLIMORE, supra note 14, at 525-30; H. SOULSBY, THE RIGHT OF SEARCH AND
THE SLAVE TRADE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1814-1862 (1933), republished
in 51 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

115 (1933); 3

88.

WHARTON'S

DIGEST, supra note 28, at 122-71.

Justice Story, for example, held in 1822 that the slave trade was "founded in a

violation of some of the first principles, which ought to govern nations. It is repugnant to
the great principles of Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of
good faith and morality, and the eternal maxims of social justice." United States v. La

Jeune Eug6nie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
89. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 458; Wilson, Some Principle Aspects of
British Efforts to Crush the African Slave Trade, 1807-1929, 44 A.J.I.L. 505 passim
(1950).

90. See H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 178-79.
91. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
92. International law follows the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt-states
are not bound by treaties to which they are not party. This principle is codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969, art. 34,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980); see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 619-22.
93. See infra note 97.
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would seek to abolish the trade. 4 That year, Great Britain and France
expressed similar resolve in a separate article to the Treaty of Paris. 95 In
1815, all signatories to the Treaty of Paris declared the slave trade "repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality."9 6 Unfortunately, none of these treaties contained a reciprocal visit and search
provision-rendering these bold statements largely impotent. While
states were fervent in their disavowal of the trade, they did not so readily
concede the right to interfere with their merchant fleets.
Over the course of the century, however, states gradually began to
concede jurisdiction over their shipping for the purpose of suppressing
the slave trade.97 In treaties of 183198 and 1833, 9 France and Great
Britain granted each other the mutual droit de visite. Other European
maritime powers acceded to these treaties, 0 0 the provisions of which
were expanded in the Quintuple Treaty of 1841.101 The Quintuple
Treaty-signed by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and
France-provided that "the High Contracting Parties agree by common

94. Treaty of Ghent, done Dec. 24, 1814, United States-Great Britain, art. 10, 8
Stat. 218, 223, T.S. No. 109.
95. Definitive Treaty of Peace and Amity, Additional Articles between France and
Great Britain, art. 1, done May 30, 1814, 63 Parry's T.S. 171, 193-94.
96. Declaration of the Eight Courts Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade, done
Feb. 8, 1815, 63 Parry's T.S. 473, 474 (translation); see Definitive Treaty of Peace,
Additional Article, done Nov. 20, 1815, 65 Parry's T.S. 251, 306. On this aspect of the
Congress of Vienna, see C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 458-59; D. GREIG, supra note
44, at 334; H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 75; H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 168-69 &
n.85.
97. History credits Great Britain with making the first meaningful steps in abolishing the slave trade. In 1815, the British Government invited France to sign a treaty that
provided for the reciprocal right of search upon suspicion of slave trading. France declined the invitation. H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 170 n.85 (Dana's note). France
again refused to concede the right of search at the 1822 Congress of Verona. Declaration
Respecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, done Nov. 28, 1822, 73 Parry's T.S. 31.
Great Britain persevered and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, was party to a
number of treaties for the suppression of the slave trade, all but two of which (treaties
with the United States and France) provided for a mutual droit de visite. C. COLOMBOS,
supra note 9, at 459-60. At that time, one-fourth of the British fleet was employed in
enforcing these treaty obligations. As a result, 117,000 slaves were freed at sea by Great
Britain between 1810 and 1846. Wilson, supra note 89, at 515 & nn.62-63 (1950).
98. Convention for the More Effectual Suppression of the Traffic in Slaves, done
Nov. 30, 1831, Great Britain-France, 18 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 641, 9 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 544.
99. Supplementary Convention, done Mar. 22, 1833, Great Britain-France, 20
BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 286, 9 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 549.
100. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 459; H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 169.
101. See H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 169.
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consent, that those of their ships of war which shall be provided with
special warrants and orders . . . may search every merchant-vessel be-

longing to any one of the High Contracting Parties which shall, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the traffic in
slaves." 1 2 Belgium later acceded to the treaty.10 3 The battle against the
slave trade was joined.
The United States did not allow foreign interference with its shipping
until several years after the signing of the Quintuple Treaty. In the 1862
Treaty of Washington, the United States-due partly to the exigencies of
the then-raging Civil War-finally agreed to concede to Great Britain
the mutual right of visit. The treaty provided that the public ships of
either state could detain, search, seize, and send in for adjudication those
merchant vessels of the other state reasonably suspected of trading in
slaves.1 4
In 1890, a group of states signed the first truly multilateral response
to the slave trade problem-the General Act of Brussels."0 5 The General
Act of Brussels effectively "placed the cornerstone [on the] edifice of bilateral treaties" constructed over the previous half-century.'0 6 The General Act permitted, for the purpose of repressing the slave trade, a mutual search within a defined zone on the eastern coast of Africa of vessels

102. Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, done Dec. 20, 1841, art.
2, 92 Parry's T.S. 437, 441. All signatories, except France, ratified this treaty. In 1845,
France entered into a separate arrangement with Great Britain that provided for naval
cooperation in the suppression of the slave trade but not, curiously, for a mutual right of
search. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Slaves, done May 29, 1845,
Great Britain-France, 33 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 4, 56, 98 Parry's T.S. 219; see
C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 459; H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 169.
103. Done Feb. 28, 1848, 102 Parry's T.S. 95.
104. Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade (Treaty of Washington),
done Apr. 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 1225, T.S. No. 126; see also Additional Article, done Feb.
17, 1863, 13 Stat. 645, T.S. No. 127. The Treaty of Washington provided for mixed
claims tribunals to entertain seizure claims. A supplementary treaty, signed in 1870,
abolished the establishment of mixed claims tribunals and substituted therefor the courts
of the contracting parties. Additional Convention, done June 3, 1870, 16 Stat. 777, T.S.
No. 131. On the Treaty of Washington, see C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 459-60; 2
MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 22, at 946-48; H. WHEATON, supra note 32, at 170-71

n.85 (Dana's/note).
105. General Act of the Brussels Conference Relating to the African Slave Trade,
done July 2, 1890, 27 Stat. 886, T.S. No. 383, 173 Parry's T.S. 293 [hereinafter General Act of Brussels]. Seventeen states eventually signed and ratified the General Act of
Brussels. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 882.
106. Gutteridge, Supplementary Slavery Convention, 1956, 6 I.C.L.Q. 449, 456
(1957).
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of less than than five hundred tons burden. 107 The agreement remained
in force until superseded in 1919 by the Treaty -of St. Germain-en08
Laye.
The Slavery Convention,"' signed in 1926 under the auspices of the
League of Nations, "embraced an undertaking on the part of the contracting parties to negotiate a general convention with regard to the slave
trade which would give them 'rights and impose upon them duties.' "1o
The Slavery Convention, however, "failed to substitute for the Brussels
Act and for the crumbling structure of nineteenth-century treaties on
which the Brussels Act was based, satisfactory provisions for the international control of the slave trade at sea." ' Specifically, the Slavery Convention failed to provide a mutual right of visit or an otherwise effective
enforcement mechanism applicable to suspected slave traders under a
foreign flag. The subsequent Supplementary Slavery Convention of 1956
was intended to fill the lacunae left by the previous Slavery Convention; the Supplementary Slavery Convention, however, added little to
the Slavery Convention and failed, as did its predecessor, to provide for a
mutual droit de visite.
B.

The Modern Rule

In the second half of the twentieth-century, the right to visit suspected
slave traders on the high seas gained currency in international thought
and practice. The same year that the Supplementary Slavery Convention
was opened for signature, the International Law Commission submitted
a report to the United Nations General Assembly which recommended
that certain measures be taken for the abolition of the slave trade. Specif-

107. Id. at 456-57; General Act of Brussels, supra note 105, arts. 22-3.
108. Treaty Revising the General Act of Berlin and the Declaration of Brussels
(Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye), done Sept. 10, 1919, 49 Stat. 3027, T.S. No. 877, 225
Parry's T.S. 500. This treaty provided that the parties would seek to "secure the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the black slave trade by land and sea."
Id. art. 11; see 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 766.
109. Slavery Convention, done Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60
L.N.T.S. 253.
110. 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 766 (quoting Slavery Convention, supra note
109, art. 3).
111. Gutteridge, supra note 106, at 460.
112. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201,
T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 40. On the Supplementary Convention on Slavery, see
C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 461-62; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32,
at 880; Gutteridge, supra note 106, at 461-69.
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ically, the Commission advocated the reciprocal right of visit and search
within certain "maritime zones treated as suspect in the international
conventions for the abolition of the slave trade.""' 3 The recommendation
was adopted, with some modification, two years later in the 1958 Con4
vention on the High Seas."
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas contains several provisions
relative to slave trade. Article 13 provides:
Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the
transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the
unlawful use of its flag for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board
any ship, whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free." 5
More important, the Convention provides for a reciprocal right of visitation and search of suspected slave traders; article 22 provides that "a
warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is
not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting . . .[t]hat the ship is engaged in the slave trade."11 6 Upon encountering such a vessel, the warship may "send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the
documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination
on board the ship."" 7 The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea retains these provisions without substantive modification." 8
These last two conventions-the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea-finally give the international community an effective tool to deploy against those engaged in
the slave trade. They moreover solidify a century and a half of political
and social evolution with respect to slave trade. The willingness of states
to bind themselves to such agreements arguably provides a firm customary basis for the seizure of non-national vessels on the high seas suspected of the slave trade." 9 The weight of time and the consistent prac-

113. 1956 Report of the I.L.C., supra note 55, art. 46, at 29, [1956] 2 Y.B. I.L.C. at
261.
114. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(1)(b).
115. Id. art. 13.
116. Id. art. 22(1)(b).
117. Id. art. 22(2).
118. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, arts. 99, 110(1)(b), (2).
119. The Convention on the High Seas purports to be "generally declaratory of established principles of [customary] international law." Convention on the High Seas,
supra note 6, preamble. Churchill and Lowe write that the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas is "generally regarded as codifying customary international law in this re-

spect." R.

CHURCHILL

& A.

LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA

150-51 (1983).
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tice of states 120 with regard to this matter beg the conclusion that the
right to seize on the high seas non-national vessels suspected of slave
trading is no longer a merely conventional right; the right to seize suspected slave traders likely exists today as a customary right.
V.

THE STATELESS VESSEL EXCEPTION

A. Seizure of Stateless Vessels on the High Seas
21
Order upon the high seas is predicated on the nationality of ships.
A ship's nationality determines which state is competent to exercise juris23
diction over her;1 22 which state may impose regulations upon her;
120. The International Court of Justice has held that in the formation of custom,
state practice "should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the
provision invoked;-and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den./W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 43.
121. B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 92 (1962) ("This subjection of the high
seas to juridical order is organized and effected by means of a permanent legal relation
between ships flying a particular flag and the state whose flag they fly."); I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 4, at 424 ("In the maintenance of a viable regime for common use of the high
seas the law of the flag and the necessity for a ship to have a flag are paramount."); R.
CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 179 ("The ascription of nationality to ships
is one of the most important means by which public order is maintained at sea."); C.
COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 288-89; 1 G. GIDEL, supra note 11, at 73 ("L'attribution
aux navires de mer d'une identitE et d'une nationalitE est le corollaire du principe du
libre usage de la haute mer. Grace A cette r.glementation.., les navires peuvent 8tre
surveill6s, contr6l~s: les abus que pourrait en~tainer le principe de ]a libert6 des mers se
trouvent limitfs si l'on n'admet a l'usage deles mers que les navires pouvant justifier
d'une nationalit6."), 80-83; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, §§ 260-61; M. McDOUGAL
& W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 1010 ("[B]oth the substantive and jurisdictional policies
comprising the established system of public order of the oceans project, and are built
upon, a fundamental distinction between national and non-national vessels."); 2
O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 750-51; R. RIENOW, THE TEST OF
THE NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 13-14 (1937); M. SHAW, supra note 45,
at 317; Anderson, Jurisdiction over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal
Under Domestic and InternationalLaw, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 335-36 (1982).
122, The flag-state has exclusive jurisdiction over vessels that lawfully fly its
flag-with certain discrete exceptions that comprise the subject matter of this Note. The
exclusivity principle of flag-state jurisdiction and the nationality of ships go hand-inhand. Smith writes, "The principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State makes it
necessary that every ship which is lawfully on the high seas should have a definite nationality." H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 64. Were vessels free to ply the high seas without a flag, the notion of flag-state jurisdiction and the order of the high seas predicated
thereon would be a nullity. The International Law Commission observes, "The absence
of any authority over ships sailing the high seas would lead to chaos. One of the essential
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which state may hail her into court for the violation of a domestic or
international law;124 which state is liable under international law for acts
of the ship fairly attributable to the state; 125 and which state may take
up the ship's claim should she suffer injury at the hands of another
state.126 Unless a ship lawfully sails under the flag of a recognized state,
the elaborate system of rules established for the maintenance of order
upon the high seas is meaningless.' 27 Without the nationality of ships,

adjuncts to the principle of the freedom of the seas is that a ship must fly the flag of a
single State and that it is subject to the jurisdiction of that State." 1956 Report of the
I.L.C., supra note 55, art. 30, comment (1), at 25, [1956] 2 Y.B. I.L.C. at 279.
123. R. RIENOW, supra note 121, at 7. States not only have the right to proscribe
regulations for their merchant fleet, they are obliged to do so. The 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention provides that "[elvery State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag." Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 94(1). Article 94 mirrors the language of
article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6. Both conventions set
forth a nonexhaustive list of the duties of effective jurisdiction. These duties include the
obligation to ensure safety at sea in regard to (1) the seaworthiness of ships; (2) the
manning of ships; (3) the use of signals; (4) the maintenance of communications; and (5)
the prevention of collisions. Id. art. 10; Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7,
art. 94(3). The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea goes further, requiring flagstates regularly to survey those ships that fly their flag and to ensure that the captain and
crew of such vessels possess appropriate qualifications, are well-trained, and are conversant with applicable international regulations. Id. art. 94(4); see R. CHURCHILL & A.
LOWE, supra note 119, at 184-93; 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at
831-36; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 265; 9 WHITEMAN'S DIGEST, supra note 43,
at 2-3.
124. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, arts. 92(1), 94(2)(b); Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 6(1); see B. BOcZEK, supra note 121, at 92; R.
CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 180; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 261;
M. SHAW, supra note 45, at 317.
125. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 180; C. COLOMBOS, supra note
9, at 289.
126. B. BOCZEK, supra note 121, at 92; R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note

119, at 180; C.

COLOMBOS,

supra note 9, at 289; R.

RIENOW,

supra note 121, at 14.

127. Professor Westlake observes that by assigning nationality to a ship, the state
"accepts the authority and responsibility which result from the ship's nationality. The
responsibility can be real only if the ship belongs to a port of the state, on her return to
which the captain, crew and passengers can be punished for any offenses they may have
committed at sea." 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 169. The Indian Government
made a similar argument before the International Court of Justice in the LM.C.O. case:
The law of nations imposes the duty on every State having a maritime flag to
provide by its own municipal laws the conditions to be fulfilled by those vessels
which must need sail under its flag. The registration of ships and the need to fly
the flag of the country where the ship is registered are considered essentialfor the
maintenance of order on the open sea ....
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the regime of the high seas is a nullity. 128
Because the international regime for the peaceful use of the high seas
is founded upon the nationality of ships and the notion of flag-state jurisdiction, stateless vessels are anathema upon the high seas. International
law appropriately forbids stateless vessels from the high seas and severs
from them the bundle of rights and freedoms that ordinary attach to
ships sailing there. 2 "[T]he freedom of the open sea," writes Lord Simonds, "is a freedom of ships which fly, and are entitled to fly, the flag
of a State which is within the comity of nations."1 30 Although "statelessness" is not per se repugnant to the law of nations,"3 1 stateless vessels
may nevertheless suffer extraordinary penalties by virtue of that condition. Harsh treatment of stateless vessels is justified by the danger that
stateless vessels pose to the international regime of the high seas.
A more cynical justification for the hostile treatment of stateless vessels
is that a stateless vessel ipso facto lacks a flag-state competent to seek
redress on her behalf'3 2 and is therefore vulnerable to the exercise of
jurisdiction by any state. This justification has support in the decision in
the English case of Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine,3 ' the
locus classicus of the stateless vessel exception to the exclusivity rule.
This 1949 case arose from the seizure by a British destroyer of the motor

Written Statement of the Government of India, 1960 I.C.J. Pleadings (Constitution of
the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization) 253 (June 8, 1960) (emphasis added).
128. Rienow observes, "The entire legal system which States have evolved for the
regulation of the use of the high seas is predicated on the possession by each vessel of a
connection with a State having a recognized maritime flag. This connection has been
commonly called nationality." R. RIENOW, supra note 121, at 13-14.
129. The Convention on the Law of the Sea sets out a non-exhaustive list of freedoms that states may exercise on the high seas, including the freedom of navigation, the
freedom to fish, and the freedom to conduct scientific research. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 7, art. 87; see Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 2; see
also C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 64-67.
130. Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, 1948 App. Cas. 351, 369 (P.C.); see
D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 334 ("It is a basic principle of international maritime law
that a vessel can only enjoy the freedom of the seas if it is entitled to sail under the flag
of a state."); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 261 ("[Tlhe freedom of navigation on the
open sea is freedom for such vessels only as sail under the flag of a State."); M. SHAW,
supra note 45, at 317 ("A ship without a flag will be deprived of many of the benefits
and rights available under the legal regime of the high seas.").
131. H. MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPs 318 (1967).
132. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 151; 2 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 607; 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at
755-56.
133. 1948 App. Cas. 351 (P.C.).
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vessel Asya on the high seas. The Asya flew no colors when the destroyer
first sighted her. The destroyer exercised her right of reconnaissance
and the Asya hoisted the Turkish flag. The destroyer became suspicious
and sent a boarding party to the Asya, whereupon the Asya hauled down
the Turkish colors and ran up a "flag which was not the flag of any
State in being."1'34 The boarding party failed to uncover the Asya's papers or any evidence linking her to a recognized state. The destroyer
promptly seized the Asya and escorted her to Haifa, where she was confiscated.135 The ensuing litigation eventually came before the Privy
Council of the United Kingdom, which observed:
[T]he freedom of the open sea, whatever those words may connote, is a
freedom of ships which fly, and are entitled to fly, the flag of a State
which is within the comity of nations. The Asya did not satisfy these elementary conditions. No question of comity nor of any breach of international law can arise ifthere is no State under whoseflag the vessel sails.
. ..Having no usual ship's papers which would serve to identify her,
flying the Turkish flag, to which there was no evidence she had a right,
hauling it down on the arrival of a boarding party and later hoisting a
flag which was not the flag of any State in being, the Asya could not
claim the protection of any State nor could any State claim that any principle of international law was broken by her seizure.136
The fundamental principle enounced in the Asya opinion, that stateless
vessels are fair game, has considerable support and is codified in the
recent Law of the Sea Convention.3

134. Id. at 370. This flag was the Zionist bunting later to become the flag of Israel.
The vessel itself was engaged in the illegal transportation of over seven hundred immigrants to Palestine. Id. at 352.
135. The seizure of the Asya provides a textbook example of the operation of the
customary right of reconnaissance blossoming into the fuller droit de visite upon the
suspicious behavior of the reconnoitered vessel. See supra note 27.
136. Molvan, 1948 App. Cas. at 369-70 (emphasis added).
137. The 1982 Convention provides, "[A] warship which encounters on the high seas
a foreign ship .. .is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that ... the ship is without nationality . . . ." Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(1)(d).
Interestingly, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas contains no provision similar to
article 110(1)(d), leading one delegate to the Geneva Conference to posit that, under the
Convention on the High Seas, "ships could sail without flying a flag, without having a
nationality and without being subject to the legislation of any state." H. MEYERS, supra
note 131, at 310 (statement of Pfeiffer, Delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany).
Although the 1958 Convention fails to provide a conventional right to seize stateless
vessels, states may nevertheless assert such a right as a matter of customary law. The
obligation to sail under the flag of a recognized state predated the 1958 Convention,
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As earlier discussed, the public ships of every state, exercising their
customary right of reconnaissance,may approach any private vessel they
may encounter upon the high seas to ascertain her nationality.1 38 Should
the approached vessel appear of dubious nationality, the right of reconnaissance may ripen into the fuller droit de visite, permitting the approaching vessel to board the suspect vessel to examine her papers. 39 If
this examination fails to discharge the suspicion that the vessel is without
nationality, the investigating warship may search, seize, and place the
suspicious vessel under the jurisdiction of the warship's flag-state.14 Ac-

which simply failed to codify the customary right to seize stateless vessels. See Molvan,
1948 App. Cas. at 369-70.
138. See supra part II, section B.1.
139. The Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that
the warship may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it
may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further
examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible
consideration.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(2).
140. Molvan, 1948 App. Cas. at 369-70; R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note
119, at 151; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 1084-86; 2 O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 607; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 4, at 755-56; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 261; Anderson, supra note 121, at
335-37.
The United States Congress recently took advantage of the unique opportunities that
statelessness offers by enacting the Biaggi Act. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1904 (Supp. V 1987). The Biaggi Act provides:
It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on board a

vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to knowingly or intentionally
manufacture or distribute, or fo possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance.
Id. § 1903(a) (emphasis added). The Biaggi Act defines "vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States" as including
(A) a vessel without nationality;
(B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas ....
Id. § 1903(c)(1). The Biaggi Act further defines "vessel without nationality" within the
meaning of the Act as
(A) a vessel aboard which the master or person in charge makes a claim of registry, which claim is denied by the flag nation whose registry is claimed; and
(B) any vessel aboard which the master or person in charge fails, upon request of
an officer of the United States empowered to enforce applicable provisions of
United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel.
Id. § 1903(c)(2).
The Biaggi Act has withstood legal challenge. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit determined that the United States may seize stateless vessels upon
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cordingly, any ship that sails the high seas must possess nationality and
the means to prove'it 14

the high seas, finding that suchseizure "in no way transgresses recognized principles of
international law." United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub nom. Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); see
also United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 969 (1987); United States v. Gonzalez, 810 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Manute, 767
F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Marquez, 759 F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1985).
There is no express exception to the exclusivity rule for vessels suspected of drugsmuggling. Absent a per se rule, however, a state may argue perhaps validly that drugsmugglers fall within the self-defense exception and may be arrested as such. See infra
part VI. This proposition is controversial and no attempt will be made to resolve it here.
For further reading on this issue and on the Biaggi Act, as applied to stateless vessels, see
Anderson, supra note 121; Note, Drug Enforcement on the High Seas: Stateless Vessel
Jurisdiction over Shipboard Criminality by Non-resident Alien Crewmembers-United
States v. Alvarez-Mena, 11 MAR. LAW. 163 (1986); Note, High on the High Seas: Drug
Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 725 (1980); Note, The Marijuana on the High Seas Act and Jurisdiction over
Stateless Vessels, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 313 (1983); Note, "Smoke on the Water":
Coast Guard Authority to Seize Foreign Vessels Beyond the Contiguous Zone, 13 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 249 (1980); Note, United States v. Marino-Garcia: CriminalJurisdiction over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 141 (1983);
Comment, Stateless Vessels and the High Seas Narcotics Trade: United States Courts
Deviatefrom InternationalPrinciples ofJurisdiction,9 MAR. LAW. 273 (1984); Development, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1983); Recent Development, 20 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 397 (1979); Recent Case, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 292 (1983). On maritime drug
interdiction generally, see Anderson, In the Wake of the Dauntless: The Background and
Development of Maritime Interdiction Operations, in WHAT LIES AHEAD?, supra note
41, at 11; Friedman, Cuba Accuses U.S. of Firing on Freighter, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
1990, at A7, col. 1.
141. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 289; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 4, at 750-51; 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 168-69; Anderson, supra note 121,
at 341. The ship's flag serves as prima facie evidence of nationality. C. COLOMBOS,
supra note 9, at 291-93; 2 H. HALLECK, supra note 8, at 250, n.2; M. McDOUGAL &
W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 1120-21; 2 MOORE's DIGEST, supra note 22, at 1002; 2 J.
MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 1421 (1898) (Montijo arbitration); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, §§ 261-62; 1 J. ORTOLAN, supra note 20, at 252; Anderson,
supra note 121, at 338-39. For a generous treatment of the relationship between flag and
nationality, see R. RIENOW, supra note 121, at 140-53.
Rarely, however, is the possession of a mere piece of bunting sufficient proof of nationality. A vessel must be possessed of papers or documentary proof of nationality. Badger v.
Gutierez, 111 U.S. 734, 736-37 (1884); The Merritt, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 582, 586
(1873) ("The documents a vessel cariries furnish the only evidence of her nationality.");
The Mohawk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 566, 571 (1865); C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 295;
1 G. GIDEL, supra note 11, at 89-90; 2 HACKWORTH'S DIGEST, supra note 66, at 724-
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Conditions Rendering a Vessel Stateless

The operation of various circumstances may render a ship stateless
and subject to the jurisdiction of any state. The want of proper registration with a recognized state is the most obvious such circumstance. Even
a properly registered ship, however, may be assimilated to a stateless
vessel by operation of law. Statelessness and the assimilation to statelessness are discussed below. For now, it is necessary only to observe that
"statelessness" is a term of art that imports a meaning beyond the mere
lack of a flag.
1. Stateless Vessels
A ship on the high seas that is not entitled to fly the flag of any recognized state is stateless and ipso facto vulnerable to seizure by any
state.'4 2 This axiom points up the importance in ascertaining whether a
ship is entitled to the flag she flies.
By long-standing custom, the flag-state has complete discretion in
ascribing nationality to its merchant fleet. The United States Supreme
Court has held:
Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law ...is that
which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag. Each state under
international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will
grant its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility
for it and acquiring authority over it. 4"

25; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 1118-20; R. RIENOW, supra note
121, at 154-88; 4 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6974 (1971); Anderson, supra note' 121, at 338-39. The 1982 Convention-on the Law of
the Sea provides that "[elvery State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right
to fly its flag documents to that effect." Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7,
art. 91(2); see Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
Professor Oppenheim indicates that while there is some difference of opinion among
states as to the number and kind of papers that a ship must possess, all states agree that
at the very least a ship must carry (1) a certificate of registry, passport, sea-letter, seabrief, or some official voucher issued by the state which indicates the ship's nationality;
(2) the muster roll; (3) the log book; (4) the manifest of cargo; (5) the bills of lading; and
(6) the charter party, if applicable. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 262; see C.
COLOMnOS, supra note 9, at 295.
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
143. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953). The Permanent Court of Arbitration tackled this issue in the case of the Muscat Dhows. There, the Court considered
an 1844 treaty between France and the Sultan of Muscat, pursuant to which France
issued documents authorizing subjects of the Sultan to fly the French flag. The Court
held that every sovereign state possesses the right to decide to whom it shall accord the
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Although this rule remains largely intact today, support is growing for
the view that the international community need not recognize a state's
allocation of nationality unless there exists a "genuine link" between the
flag-state and the ship." Judge Jessup, dissenting in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., argues that "[i]f a State purports to confer its
nationality on ships by allowing them to fly its flag, without assuring
that they meet such tests as management, ownership, jurisdiction and
control, other States are not bound to recognize the asserted nationality
'
of the ship." 145
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea at first blush appears to
follow the traditional rule, providing that "[e]very State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly."1

46

But the

provision reads further: "There must exist a genuine link between the
State and the ship.11 47 The Convention does not, however, specify the

right to fly its flag and to prescribe the rules governing such grants. The granting of the
French flag to the subjects of the Sultan of Muscat was, therefore, proper and not an
impermissible encroachment upon the sovereign independence of the Sultan. Affaire des
Boutres de Mascate (Muscat Dhows) (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 11 R.I.A.A. 83 (1905). For
support of the proposition that a state has complete discretion in ascribing its nationality
to ships, see B. BOCZEK, supra note 121, at 99-106; J. BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 310; I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 424; R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 180;
C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 289-91; C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 373-74
(4th ed. 1965); 1 G. GIDEL, supra note 11, at 80; M. MODOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra
note 32, at 1011-12; 2 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 606; 2
O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 752-53; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
4, § 261 ("[A] State is absolutely independent in framing the rules concerning the claim
of vessels to its flag."); R. RIENOW, supra note 121, at 15-23; 5 J. VERZIJL, supra note
141, at 146-47.
144. Brownlie, for one, believes the traditional method of ascription of nationality
"suffers from.., organic faults." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 424. On the "genuine
link" requirement, as applied to natural persons, see Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.),
1955 I.C.J. 4; see also R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 180-82 (discussing the effect of Nottebohm on the genunine link requirement as applicable to ships).
Read narrowly, the Nottebohm case stands for the principle that the ascription of nationality to a person by a state is not opposable to another state to which the person is
connected by a genuine link. Under this construction of Nottebohm, the flag-state of a
ship flying a flag of convenience would have no claim against a state to which the ship is
genuinely connected, should the latter state assert jurisdiction over that ship on the high
seas.
145. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 188 (Jessup, J., dissenting).
146. Convention on the Law of'the Sea, supra note 7, art. 91(1).
147. Id. (emphasis added). Article 91(1) parallels the more expansive Convention on
the High Seas, which provides that "[t]here must exist a genuine link between the State
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nature of the relationship necessary to discharge this genuine link requirement; nor does the Convention spell out the consequences, if any,
that flow from the lack of such a genuine link.
The requirement of a genuine link is controversial and does not likely
reflect the current state of customary international law. What little support the requirement does command derives mainly from publicists, who
argue that ships unconnected with their flag-state by a genuine link pose
a danger to the order of the high seas; the genuine link requirement is
necessary, they argue, to rid the high seas of ships sailing under flags of
convenience."" The belief that ships under flags of convenience are unruly is ill-founded. Professor Bowett writes, "Obviously, if there had
been evidence to show that vessels [unconnected to their flag-state by a
genuine link] were productive of anarchy and disorder in the sense that
the flag States exercised no effective jurisdiction over them, then the case
for restriction would be compelling: but there appears to be no such
evidence." 4"
Independent of the merits on either side of this complex issue, international law still abides by the traditional rule; a ship properly registered
150
under the laws of a recognized state bears the nationality of that state.
Fortunately, for the purposes of this Note, the issue of the genuine link
is a nice one, concerning to whom the ship belongs and not whether she
is stateless. A ship is not stateless if she is registered with a recognized
state, no matter how tenuous her connection to that state may be. Deand the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over shipsflying its flag." Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 5(1) (emphasis added). This language reappears without substantive modification in the 1982 Convention under the head "Duties
of the flag State." Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 94(1).
148. "Flag of convenience" or "open registry" states-most notably Panama, Liberia, and Honduras (the "Panlibhon" states)-are those whose registration requirements
are notoriously lax, enabling shipowners to dodge the stringent maintenance rules and
hefty fees required by most other states. See generally B. BOCZEK, supra note 121; R.
CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE

(1981). The 1982 Convention on the Law of the

Sea seeks to remedy the problem believed posed by such states by requiring flag-states to
exercise effective jurisdiction over its merchant fleet. See supra note 123.
149. D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 56-57 (1967). In the twenty years that
have passed since Professor Bowett made this observation, however, the world has witnessed the advent of the drug smuggler-who in many cases operates under the flag of a
state that fails to exercise effective jurisdiction over him. See generally Anderson, supra
note 121; see also supra note 140.
150. See supra note 143. On the nationality of ships, see generally B. BOcZEK,
supra note 121, at 91-124; M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 1008-140;

supra note 131; R. RIENOW, supra note 121; Watts, The Protection of
Merchant Ships, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 52.
H. MEYERS,
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spite the sound and fury over the genuine link requirement, flag of convenience vessels are not stateless and are not for that reason amenable to
visitation on the high seas. 151 Vessels not registered under the laws of a
recognized state1 2 are, however, stateless properly so called; such ships
may be seized as stateless vessels.
2.

Vessels Assimilated to Stateless Vessels

A ship properly registered with a state may lose her allocation of nationality by operation of law should she abuse her flag. The ascription of
nationality of ships is so important to the regime of the high seas that a
vessel which abuses that ascription is deprived of its protection. Such a
vessel is assimilated to a vessel without nationality and risks seizure as a
stateless vessel. The Convention on the Law of the Sea provides, "A ship
which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according
to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with
respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without
53
nationality.'
As observed above, order on the high seas follows from the existence of
a flag-state competent to ensure the good behavior of ships under its
151. Were this otherwise, more than one-quarter of the world's merchant fleet would
be stateless; as of 1980, that percentage of the world's merchant shipping tonnage was
registered in Liberia and Panama alone. Lloyds Register of Shipping Statistical Tables,
reprinted in R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 179.
152. A ship must fly the flag of a recognized state. In the Asya case, discussed above,
a British destroyer seized a vessel that had hoisted the flag of Israel which, in 1948, was
not yet a recognized state. Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, 1948 App. Cas.
351 (P.C.); see supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
Historically, vessels were required to fly the flag of states entitled to a maritime
flag-a right generally unavailable to states without a coastline. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 4, § 262; 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 169. The 1958 Convention on the High
Seas and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea eliminate this traditional requirement by providing that every recognized state-whether coastal or landlocked-has the
right to a maritime flag. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 4; Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 90. International organizations are also competent to register ships to sail the high seas under the flag of the organization. See R.
CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 182-83; H. MEYERS, supra note 131, at
323-51; 5 J. VERZIJL, supra note 141, at 150. This principle is codified in the 1958
Convention on the High Seas and in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 7; Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 7, art. 93.
153. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 92(2); see Convention on
the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 6(2). If a warship suspects that a vessel, although
flying the flag of another state, is actually a vessel of the same nationality as the warship,
the warship may visit her to determine her true character. See infra part VIII.
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flag. 5 A ship that sails randomly under two or more flags is as repugnant to this principle as a ship with no flag at all.155 Accordingly, a ship
may sail under no more than one flag at a time. 156
A ship nevertheless may be entitled to two or more flags, "for the only
rule that international law would seem to have is that a ship must be
jurisdictionally attached to one State only for a particular purpose at a
particular time, not that it may not have double factors which connect it
for different purposes to different States. 15 7 International law merely
bars the use of one or more flags "according to convenience." Indeed, the
above-quoted provision contained in the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea concerns the use of flags, not the entitlement to a flag or flags. A
ship might therefore be entitled to multiple flags and would not be
stripped of her nationality unless she failed to fly one of them
1 58
consistently.
VI.
A.

THE SELF-DEFENSE EXCEPTION

Self-Defense on the High Seas

Customary international law permits a state to take reasonable measures to defend itself from aggressive threats to its political security or
territorial integrity.1 59 In order for this right to obtain, however, there

154. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
155. Meyers observes:
The possibility of two allocations existing simultaneously is contrary to the maintenance of good order at sea. If the existence of multiple allocations should be
possible, it would be difficult to reconcile with the "exclusive jurisdiction", which
is such an essential legal construction for the whole of the Convention on the High
Seas. What law would apply on board, what treaties would be applicable to the
ship-users?
H. MEYERS, supra note 131, at 173.
156. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 92(1); Convention on the
High Seas, supra note 6, art. 6(1); see Arakas Bros. v.Bulgaria, 7 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 39,
42 (1926) ("L'opinion unanime des auteurs reconnalt que tout vaisseau doit avoir une
nationalitE et une seule nationalitE."); B. BOCZEK, supra note 121, at 105; H. MEYERS,
supra note 131, at 171-79; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 261. 157. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 754-55.
158. Id. at 755. That a ship may be entitled to more than one flag points up the
difficulty in framing a coherent definition of the nationality of ships. This difficult issue
is, however, beyond the ambit of this Note, although it receives excellent treatment else-

where. See generally H. MEYERS, supra note 131, at 171-79.
159. See generally D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); I.
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); D.

GREIG, supra note 44, at 876-900.
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must exist "a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."16 This oft-quoted
formula, emanating from the Caroline incident, is widely accepted as
declaratory of customary international law. 16 '
While the right of self-defense, as a general proposition, is wellfounded and uncontroversial, much controversy does exist over the scope
and extent of this right. The right unquestionably obtains in the event of
an actual armed attack against a state,"6 2 but there is less certainty
whether a state may respond to an imminent attack or to threats that do
not amount to an actual armed attack.' State practice and opinion nev-

160. Letter from Mr. Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (July 27, 1842), reprinted
in Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 A.J.I.L. 82, 89 (1938) [hereinafter
Caroline Letter].
161. The Legal Advisor of the United States Department of State observed, consistent with the Caroline rule, that
the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense depends upon a prior delict, an
illegal act that presents an immediate, overwhelming danger to an actual and essential right of the state. When these conditions are present, the means used must
then be proportionate to the gravity of the threat or danger.
Memorandum from Mr. Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to
Mr. John Morrison, Deputy General Counsel of the CIA (May 29, 1975), reprinted in
E. McDOWELL, 1975 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
17 (1976). Oppenheim expresses a similar view.
[V]iolations of other States in the interest of self-preservation are excused in cases
of necessity only. Only such acts of violence in the interest of self-preservation are
excused as are necessary in self-defence, because otherwise the acting State would
have to suffer, or have to continue to suffer, a violation against itself.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 130; see also J. BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 405-06; D.
GREIG, supra note 44, at 883-87; 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 239-40; M. SHAW,
supra note 45, at 549-50.
162. This is basic learning. One writer concludes that "[d]espite controversy and disagreement over the scope of the right of self-defence, there is an indisputable core and
that is the competence of states to resort to force in order to repel an attack." M. SHAW,
supra note 45, at 553. Indeed, the Charter of the United Nations provides that
"[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51, however, must be read alongside article 2(4) of the
Charter, which provides, "All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id. art. 2(4).
163. The modern debate on the self-defense issue focuses predominately on the putative right of anticipatory self-defense. Under the traditional Carolineequation, a state is
permitted to take anticipatory measures in its own defense, provided there exists "a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation." Caroline Letter, supra note 160 (emphasis added). The advent of the
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ertheless support the taking of defensive action in circumstances short of
an actual armed attack.
Whenever the right of self-defense properly does obtain, its exercise is
subject to the constraints of reasonableness and proportionality. Under
the customary Caroline rule, the defensive act must involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of selfdefence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."' 64
The Caroline rule, therefore, imposes on states a double constraint

United Nations casts doubt on this traditional rule. Much attention is centered upon the
construction of article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides that the
right of self-defense shall obtain in the event of an "armed attack." U.N. CHARTER art.
51. One faction, construing article 51 strictly, asserts that the right of self-defense is
limited to circumstances of actual armed attack; accordingly, they argue, article 51 disables the customary right of anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note
159, at 264-80; P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 165-66 (1968); H. KELSON,
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 269, 797-98, 918 (1964); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 4, § 52aa; Arfchaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of the Century, 159
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 87-98 (1978); Christol & Davies, Maritime Quarantine: The
Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Matbiel to Cuba, 1962, 57
A.J.I.L. 525, 531 n.32 (1963). The recent opinion of the International Court of Justice
in Nicaraguav. United States appears to follow this strict construction of article 51, but
the Court left the issue open. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98-106.
The opposing argument is put forward with equal fervor by those who assert that
article 51 does not foreclose the traditional right of anticipatory self-defense. Greig expresses the view of many:
The view has been expressed that Article 51 has restricted the right of a state to
employ force in self-defence to cases where an armed attack has occurred against
it. However, all that Article 51 is stating is that nothing contained in the Charter
restricts the pre-1945 rights of a state to meet force with force. In other words,
where international law recognised a wider right to use force in self-defence prior
to 1945, that same right still exists, subject to modifications introduced by the
Charter. These modifications relate to the procedures for settlement available to
the parties to a dispute and the powers of settlement granted to the Security Council under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and to the General Assembly under
Chapter IV. But it is clear that if these procedures do not prove adequate, a
residual power to act in self-defence must remain even where no actual armed
attack has taken place.
D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 336-37 (footnote omitted); see D. BOWETT, supra note 159,
at 185-86; J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 43, 95-96 (1958); see also J.
BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 416-21; 1 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4,
at 315-20; Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 739-50 (M. Srensen ed. 1968); Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 RECUEIL DES COURs 6, 231-37.
164. Caroline Letter, supra note 160. This proscription is taken as a declaration of
long-standing custom. See supra note 161.
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which cabins defensive action within the bounds of necessity and
reasonableness.
Subject to the Caroline limitations of necessity and reasonableness, a
state may meet a threat to its political security or territorial integrity
wherever such threat may be found, including afortiorithe high seas. A
state may therefore address a threat on the high seas even before that
threat actually consummates itself upon the territory of the state. Professor Bowett writes:
It can scarcely be contemplated that a state must remain passive whilst a
serious menace to its security mounts on the high seas beyond its territorial sea. It is accordingly maintained that it is still permissible for a state
to assume a protective jurisdiction, within the limits circumscribing every
exercise of the right of self-defence, upon the high seas in order to protect
its ships, its aircraft, and its rights of territorial integrity and political
independence from an imminent danger or actual attack.165
While controversial, this view is supported by several writers"6 and,
most important, is borne out in state practice and opinion. 6
Given this support, it is curious that the 1958 High Seas Convention
does not draw an exception to the exclusivity rule in the case of selfdefense. A possible explanation for this omission may be found in the
commentary to the original draft of that convention. There, the International Law Commission-the body responsible for the draft-reported:
The question arose whether the right to board a vessel should be recognized also in the event of a ship being suspected of committing acts hostile
165. D. BOWETT, supra note 159, at 71.
166. See, e.g., C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 315 ("[T]he right of self-defence, as
recognised by the law of nations, will confer on a State, in a case where its safety is
threatened, a self-protective jurisdiction which will entitle it to visit and arrest a vessel on
the high seas and to send her in for adjudication."); D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 341
("Once the proposition is accepted that self-defence is available as a basis for action in
the absence of an actual armed attack, it is clear that some form of interference with the
freedom of passage of foreign vessels on the high seas may be justifiable."); W. HALL,
supra note 79, at 328; 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 245; P. JEssuP, THE LAW OF
TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 97-98 (1927); H. SMITH, supra
note 18, at 70-71; 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 171; see also The Case of the S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 3, 69 (Sept. 27) (Moore, J.,
dissenting); Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 243-44, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475 (1817). This
proposition, that a state may address imminent threats on the high seas, is predicated
upon the propriety of the right of anticipatory self-defense, and is, therefore, not without
its critics. See supra note 162; see, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 250 ("[I]t may be
said here that the legal basis of such a right [of self-defense on the high seas], in the
absence of an attack on other shipping by the vessel sought to be detained, is lacking.").
167. See infra part VI, section B.
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to the State to which-the warship belongs, at a time of imminent danger to
the security of that State. The Commission did not deem it advisable to
include such a provision, mainly because of the vagueness of terms like
"imminent danger" and "hostile acts", which leaves them open to
abuse."' 8
The absence of a self-defense provision in the High Seas Convention
should not, therefore, imply that such a right was deemed nonexistent by
the International Law Commission. The Commission's tentative approach to the issue merely reflects modern sentiment vis-A-vis the right of
self-defense; states and writers at once accept the notional existence of a
right of self-defense, but are anxious and uncertain as to the scope and
practical operation of the right. Moreover, because the validity of any
assertion of the right of self-defense tends to be fact-specific, it is difficult
or impossible sufficiently to capture the right of self-defense within the
bounds of a black letter rule. In the absence of any authoritative pronouncement on the character of a maritime right of self-defense, it is
necessary briefly to examine those occasions on which states have successfully asserted the right and to sketch therefrom the broad outline of
this right.
B.

Self-Defense on the High Seas in State Practice

The right of self-defense on the high seas in time of peace is not
clearly defined. Professor Bowett observes that whereas it is "generally
recognized that a state may exercise its authority on the high seas in
exceptional circumstances where this is necessary to forestall a real
threat to its territorial integrity and general security," there exists "no
agreement on the precise nature of the circumstances which enable this
protective jurisdiction to be exercised or on the forms of prevention to
which the state may have recourse in the exercise of its right of selfdefence." 16' 9 Nevertheless, some states take measures of self-defense on
the high seas, and other states frequently support those measures-or at
least acquiesce in them. These incidents fall along a continuum; some
are of a more extreme nature than others. The readiness with which
states take and accept defensive measures relates directly to the extremity
of the threat; the more grave the threat, the more likely will a state take
defensive measures and the more readily will other states accept such
action. Because the inquiry is at bottom a factual one, it is not possible

168. 1956 Report of the I.L.C., supra note 55, art. 46, comment (4), at 30, [1956] 2
Y.B. I.L.C. at 284.
169.

D. BowEr, supra note 159, at 66.

19891

FLAG-STATE JURISDICTION EXCEPTIONS

nor terribly useful to set out a rule more specific than the Caroline
equation already discussed. 70° Accordingly, the facts of any case in which
a state asserts the right of self-defense must be viewed closely to determine first, whether defensive measures were necessary and should have
been taken; and second, whether the measures actually taken were a reasonable response to the perceived threat- The following incidents flesh
out the vague notions of necessity and reasonableness in light of state
practice and opinion.
1. The Kearsarge Incident
The French Government, during the time of the United States Civil
War, put forward one of the earliest invocations of the right of defense
against maritime threats. In 1864, the Union cruiser Kearsarge stood on
the high seas off the coast of France awaiting the Confederate vessel
Alabama, which was at that time sheltering in Cherbourg harbor.
France, fearful for its shipping and coastline, requested the United States
to withdraw the Kearsarge. While refusing to recognize any right of
France to interfere with United States warships on the high seas, the
United States advised the captain of the Kearsarge to refrain from engaging the Alabama near French waters. The French authorities subsequently escorted the Alabama beyond French territorial sea, whereupon
the Alabama encountered the Kearsarge and was sunk in a brief engagement. Although initially wary about the French assertion of this
right of self-protection, the United States did later acknowledge the legitimacy of the French position."7
2.

The Virginius Incident

The locus classicus of the right of self-defense upon the high seas is
the nineteenth century case of the Virginius. In 1873, the Virginius put
to sea bound for Cuba where a revolution against Spain was underway.
Although sailing under the United States flag, the Virginius was actually
under the control of Cuban insurgents who fraudulently obtained United
States registry and were employing the vessel to run men and guns to
170. See supra part VI, section A.
171. On the Kearsargeincident, see D. BOWETT, supra note 159, at 74-75; P. JEssup, supra note 166, at 97-98; 1 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 22, at 723-24; 1 WHARTON'S DIGEST, supra note 28, at 107-09, 114-15; see also Letter of Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Manning, Secretary of the Treasury (May 28, 1886), reprinted in
1 WHARTON'S DIGEST, supra note 28, at 108 ("[Tihe sovereign of the shore has a right,
by international law, to require that no action be taken by ships of other friendly nations
by which subjects should be injured, or the peace of the shore impaired.").
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Cuba. On the high seas, the Spanish man-of-war Tornado captured the
Virginius and brought her to Santiago de Cuba. There, the fifty-three
passengers and crew of the Virginius-Englishmen, Americans, and
Cubans-were put to death after summary court martial. A storm of
diplomatic protest followed. Spain asserted the right of self-defense.
Great Britain accepted this argument and eventually reached a settlement with Spain. The settlement, however, addressed the irregular execution of the British passengers and not the actual seizure of the
Virginius, to which Great Britain did not object. The United States refuted the Spanish assertion of a right of self-defense. When, however, it
was learned that the Virginius was not properly under United States
1 72
registry, the matter was settled -amicably between the two states.
Although the convoluted facts of the Virginius incident and the equivocal nature of the settlements lessen the incident's value as precedent, the
case of the Virginius is widely taken as support for the proposition that
states may take defensive measures against non-national ships on the
high seas in time of peace."7 3 Hyde summarizes the lesson of the
Virginius:
On grounds of self-defense an aggrieved State may subject a foreign ship
to restraint on the high seas and in times of peace, if the conduct of those
controlling the vessel is such as to render the seizure of her the necessary
mode of warding off threatened and instant danger. Circumstances may in
fact rarely combine to warrant such preventive action. In the case of the
Virginius they appear to have been such as to impose no duty on the
Spanish authorities
to refrain from seizing the vessel until she entered Cu174
ban waters.

172. On the Virginius incident, see C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 314-15; D.
GREIG, supra note 44, at 338-39; 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 244-45; 2 MOORE'S
DIGEST, supra note 22, at 895-903; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at
803-04; 1 J. WESTLAKE, supra note 43, at 171-73; 3 WHARTON'S DIGEST, supra note
28, at 147-59. See also the similar case of the Mary Lowell, P. JEssuP, supra note 166,
at 97 n.88; H. SMITH, supra note 18, at 70-71; van Zwanenberg, supra note 43, at 794,
and the case of the Deerhound, 3 WHARTON's DIGEST, supra note 28, at 153; van
Zwanenberg, supra note 43, at 794.
173. According to Greig, the "majority of writers have accepted the subsequent compensation paid by Spain to Britain as establishing the incident as authority for the proposition that self-defence may be a basis for exercising a power of arrest over foreign
vessels, including foreign warships, on the high seas." D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 33839. Greig's statement is overbroad insofar as it purports to justify an extension of jurisdiction over non-national warships. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art.
8(1); Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, arts. 95-96 (proscribing interference with non-national public ships).
174. 1 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at 245.
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In other words, the weight of circumstances attending the seizure of the
Virginius and the appropriateness of the Spanish response to those circumstances combined to satisfy the bipartite Caroline requirements of
necessity and reasonableness."7 5
3.

The Declaration of Panama

In October 1939, the foreign ministers of the American republics
adopted a resolution that stipulated in part as follows:
As a measure of continental self-protection, the American republics, so
long as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to
have those waters adjacent to the American Continent, which they regard
as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the
commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation,6
17
whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea, or air.
The putative effect of this Declaration of Panama was to disallow the
warships of any belligerent nation-Allied or Axis-from taking hostile
actions in the waters located three hundred to twelve hundred miles from
the American continent. 17 The United States Secretary of State held out
the Declaration of Panama as a justifiable measure of continental selfdefense, claiming
I believe that the creation of this zone should be considered rather as a
practical measure designed to maintain certain vital interests .... [T]he
Declaration of Panama sets forth merely a statement of principle, based
on the inherent right of self-protection rather than a formal proposal for
1 8

the modification of international law.

This novel application of the principle of self-defense by the American
republics is of dubious legality. O'Connell observes, "The view of the
British and German Governments was that the Declaration of Panama
was a legal nullity, but that it should not be opposed because in various
ways its existence served their purposes, and it was for a time effective.
175. See supra part VI, section A.
176. Report of the Delegate of the United States of America to the Meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of the American Republics Held at Panamci, Sept. 23-Oct. 3, 1939,
at 62-64, reprinted in 11 WHITEMAN'S DIGEST, supra note 43, at 451.
177. On the Declaration of Panama, see M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note
32, at 590-91; 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 806-07; 11 WHITEMAN'S DIGEST, supra note 43, at 451-57; Brown, ProtectiveJurisdiction, 34 A.J.I.L.
112 (1940); Fenwick, The Declaration of Panama, 34 A.J.I.L. 116 (1940); Masterson,
The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law, 26 A.B.A. J. 860 (1940).
178. Statement of Mr. Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, to Mr. Henry Coster, reprintedin 7 HACKWORTH'S DIGEST, supra note 66, at 703-04 (emphasis added).
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Legal opinion has not supported it."' 9
The failure of the Declaration of Panama to garner international support undoubtedly follows from the overbroad competence asserted by the
American republics. While a state may properly seek to ensure that activities of belligerents or others do not adversely affect state territory,"' 0 a
state may not take the extreme measure of closing off vast portions of the
high seas to protect itself against hypothetical dangers. Under Caroline,
a state's defensive response must be measured and in proportion to the
particular threat.1"' If the response is unreasonable vis-a-vis thb per-

179. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 807 (footnotes omitted).
180. Recall the Kearsargeincident in which France sought to ensure the same ends
contemplated by the American republics-the protection of territory and nationals from
the acts of belligerents upon the high seas. See supra part VI, section B.1. There, however, the defensive measures taken by France were not overbroad in relation to the perceived threat. Instead, France closely tailored its response to the circumstances and in so
doing properly exercised its right of self-defense.
181. O'Connell writes:
There is no question that a right of self-defence exists in the case of any ship
illegally subject to force on the high seas, but this is a different case from the
exercise of force in the interests of national self-defence. One view is that the ordinary law of self-defence applies, namely that there must be a "necessity of selfdefence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation", and that the action taken must not be "unreasonable or excessive"
and "limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it". If that were so it would
be difficult to justify a regime of visit and search unconnected with immediate
threats, and which is really intended to create a cordon sanitaire.
2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 804 (quoting Caroline Letter, supra
note 160).
States nevertheless may establish certain zones about them for their own protection.
The notion of the contiguous zone is well established in international law and is codified
in recent conventions. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea provides:
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the
coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 33; see Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signatureApr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter Convention on the Territorial Sea].
The contiguous zone is a band of ocean adjacent to the territorial sea, extending up to
twenty-four nautical miles from the baselines of the littoral state. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 33(2). The contiguous zone is neither part of the territorial
sea nor part of the high seas, but is rather part of the state's exclusive economic zone. id.
arts. 55, 86. Within this contiguous zone, the littoral state may take steps to control,
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ceived threat, international opinion will-as in the case of the Declara-

prevent, and punish violations of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws. The
authority of the state within its contiguous zone is, therefore, broader than on the high
seas but narrower than on its territorial sea. O'Connell writes:
A State exercises dominion, or at least jurisdiction, in the territorial sea, whereas
in the contiguous zone it has a limited right of police. In the territorial sea, jurisdiction involves the exercise of powers conferred -by municipal law in an area
which municipal law regards, for all practical purposes, as belonging to the coastal
State. The powers exercised by a State over foreign shipping in the contiguous
zone, however, like other powers exercised on the high seas, are derived from international law and not from municipal law, even though the latter may purport
to confer them. In the territorial sea, international law operates as a restraining
rather than an enabling force, whereas in the contiguous zone the situation is reversed. The enumeration of rights in Article 24 [of the Convention on the Territorial Sea] clearly indicates the absence of any general jurisdictional rights and their
limitation to certain stated purposes. What is exercised is not jurisdiction but
control.
2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 1058. On the concept of the contiguous zone, see id. at 1034-61; R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 101-07; 1
L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 190(ii); Gidel, La mer territorialeet la zone contigau,
48 RECUEIL DES COURS 133, 241-73 (1934).
Because the state's competence in the contiguous zone is necessarily limited to the
enforcement of customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws, no state may ordinarily
purport to create in the contiguous zone a generalized security zone or similar zone based
upon the state's inherent right of self-defense. Commenting upon its draft of the Convention on the Territorial Sea, the International Law Commission reports:
The Commission did not recognize special security rights in the contiguous zone.
It considered that the extreme vagueness of the term "security" would open the
way for abuses and that the granting of such rights was not necessary. The enforcement of customs and sanitary regulations will be sufficient in most cases to
safeguard the security of the State. In so far as measures of self-defence against an
imminent and direct threat to the security of the State are concerned, the Commission refers to the general principles of international law and the Charter of the
United Nations.
1956 Report of the I.L.C., supra note 55, art. 66, comment (4), at 39-40, [1956] 2 Y.B.
I.L.C. at 295.
A state's right to take defensive measures may still obtain in the contiguous zone, but
this right flows from customary principles of international law and not from contiguous
zone theory. There may exist circumstances in which the establishment of a security
zone-within the contiguous zone or elsewhere-conceivably is a necessary and reasonable response to a threat to the security or territorial integrity of a state. Because the
establishment of a security zone is an extreme measure, however, the circumstances justifying it must themselves be extreme. See 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4,
at 804 ("[Tjhere is a possible view that general considerations of self-defence would
operate to vindicate [the establishment of a security zone], independently of immediate
threats."); see, e.g., infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Falkland
Islands total exclusion zone).
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tion of Panama-condemn it.
The security zone established by the Declaration of Panama offended
international law not because security zones are unlawful per se,"8 2 but
because the establishment of the zone was, under the circumstances,
neither necessary nor reasonable within the meaning of the Caroline
rule. 83 McDougal and Burke observe that despite the opposition to the
Declaration of Panama, "influential publicists have affirmed the soundness of the principle embodied in the Declaration, conceding the validity
of objections to enforcement only in the particular instances in which
enforcement could be shown to be unreasonable."" 4 Had the danger
confronting the American continent been more poignant, or the response
thereto more measured, the Declaration of Panama would likely have
been more warmly received.
The recent British-Argentine conflict in the Falklands provides an example of a justifiable security zone. Incident to the Argentine invasion
and occupation of the Falkland Islands, the British Government announced on 7 April 1982 the establishment of a "maritime exclusion
zone" around the islands, within which "any Argentine warships and
Argentine naval auxiliaries found [would] be treated as hostile and
[were] liable to be attacked."' 8 8 On 28 April 1982, the British imposed a
two hundred mile "total exclusion zone" in the place of the "maritime
exclusion zone." The British Government addressed the following statement to the Goverment of Argentina:
In announcing the establishment of a total exclusion zone around the
Falklands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure
was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take
whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right to
self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. In this
connexion, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that all

182. See supra note 181.
183. See supra part VI, section A.
184. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 32, at 591. One of these "influential
publicists" writes:
We may confidently assert that the principle of protective jurisdiction enunciated
in the Declaration of Panama has never been repudiated in international law and
practice. On the contrary, the consensus of opinion, as well as of practice, overwhelmingly sustains the right of every nation to defend its laws and security from
threatened violations, under varying circumstances, in the waters contiguous to the
conventional three-mile limit ....
Brown, supra note 177, at 114.
185. 21 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1045 (1982) (statement of Mr. John Nott,
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense).
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Argentine vessels, including merchant vessels, apparently engaging in surveillance of, or intelligence-gathering activities against, British forces in
the South Atlantic will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt
with accordingly.18
The total exclusion zone was to apply
not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to
any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in
support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine
forces. The Exclusion Zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation. Any
ship and any aircraft whether military or civil which is found within this
Zone without due authority from the [Ministry of Defence] in London
will be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will
therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British
1 7
Forces.
The establishment of the total exclusion zone around the Falklands is
distinguishable from the zone established under the Declaration of Panama. In the former case, the danger was clear and present; in the latter,
the danger was vague and speculative. The circumstances in the Falklands called for immediate action, for delay could have meant loss of life
or injury to a substantial state interest. Not only was the British action
necessary, it was reasonably tailored to the circumstances. Contrary to
the action taken by the American republics, the establishment of the total
exclusion zone was a reasonable defensive measure, proportionate to the
nature of the perceived threat. The size of the zone in the British example was limited to a discrete portion of the sea; the Declaration of Panama closed off the high seas around an entire continent. More important,
the British total exclusion zone addressed the precise nature of the
threat; the purpose of the exclusion zone
seems to have been simply to overcome the necessity for determining
whether any ship or aircraft in the area presented a serious threat to the
task force, in circumstances where the time taken to make such a determination could have given a decisive advantage to the other ship or aircraft,

186.
ment of
187.
On the

Communication from the Government of the United Kingdom to the Govern-

Argentina (Apr. 29, 1982), reprinted in 1982

BRIT.

Y.B.

INT'L

L. 544.

22 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 296 (1982) (written answer of Mr. John Nott).
Falklands War and the exclusion zones, see Barston & Birnie, The Falkland
Islands/IslasMalvinas Conflict: A Question of Zones, 7 MARINE POL'Y 14 (1983). On
war zones generally, see C. COLOMBOS, supra note 9, at 528-31; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW
OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 1109-12.
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before taking action against it in self-defence.1 "
The establishment of the exclusion zone, therefore, was both necessary
and reasonable. The same cannot confidently be said about the Declaration of Panama.
4. The Algerian Emergency
During the Algerian Emergency, between 1956 and 1962, the French
Navy undertook to visit and search foreign ships on the high seas in an
effort to stem the flow of arms and munitions into Algeria. In the first
year of the operation, the French visited approximately 4775 ships.18 9
The flag-states of many of the affected vessels vigorously protested to the
French Government.' 90 In one instance, the owners of the Italian vessel
Duizar sought damages from France, claiming that the French Navy
lacked legal authority to visit and search non-national vessels on the high
seas.' While the matter of the Duizar remained largely unresolved in
the French courts, .the French Minister of Defense, in a memorial submitted to the Tribunal administratifde Paris, argued that the French
action "constituted a measure of police affecting the external safety of
the State" which was "necessary for safety reasons, and ha[d] no vexa92
tious character.'
The French action and the corresponding international response afford another illustration of the fundamental requirement of international
law that defensive action be both necessary and closely tailored to fit the
nature of the threat. There is a tantalizing similarity between the French
action and the seizure of the Virginius by Spain over eighty years earlier.' 9 3 In both cases, a state wished to quell hostilities by choking off
arms and munitions flowing to the troubled area from the high seas; yet
whereas international opinion accepts the seizure of the Virginius as
proper, condemnation of the French action is nearly universal. Churchill
and Lowe observe, "The explanation of the distinction between the responses to the Virginius and the Algerian incidents probably lies partly
in the emergence during the intervening period of rules limiting the use
of force generally . . . and partly in the scale of the French opera-

188.
189.
805-06.
190.
191.

R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 272.
See generally id. at 153; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE

SEA,

See 4

WHITEMAN'S DIGEST, supra note 43, at 513-14.
Ignazio Messina et Cie v. L'Etat, reprinted in 90 JOURNAL DU DROIT INT'L

1190 (1963).
192.
193.

supra note 4, at

Id. at 1193 (M~moire du Ministre des armes) (translation).
See supra part VI, section B.2.

1989]

FLAG-STATE JURISDICTION EXCEPTIONS

"..."194A comparison between the Algerian Emergency and the
tion .
Declaration of Panama 9 5 is likewise instructive. In both cases, the defensive response was far out of proportion to the perceived threat; and in
both cases, international condemnation was the result.
The axiom of the Caroline is again borne out in state practice-the
defensive action must contain "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since
the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it."' 96 States ignore this rule at their
peril.

5.

The Cuban Quarantine

The well-known milieu of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis provides the
backdrop to one of the more dramatic incidents of maritime visit and
search. On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy announced that "unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation"' 97 on the island of Cuba. The following
day, the Organization of American States called for the withdrawal of
missiles from Cuba and recommended that all member-states take steps
consistent with this end. Pursuant to this resolution, the President immediately ordered the United States Navy to interdict the flow of offensive
materials to Cuba. Cuba was placed under "strict quarantine,"' 9 8 and
ships proceeding there were subject to visitation and search on the high
seas. Any vessel found carrying proscribed material was turned away.
The Cuban quarantine remained in force until the United States and the
Soviet Union reached a peaceful resolution of their differences."'
On the myriad possible justifications for the Cuban quarantine,
O'Connell writes:
The legal basis for the United States action was a combination of factors:
it was said to be "a collective claim for a temporary and special use of
limited areas of the high seas"; directed not against ordinary maritime
commerce, but against a threat to the peace; the defensive character of the

194.

R.

CHURCHILL

& A.

LOWE,

supra note 119, at 153.

195. See supra part VI, section B.3.
196. Caroline Letter, supra note 160. This proscription, part of the Caroline
formula, is taken as a declaration of long-standing custom. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
197.

5 WHITEMAN'S

DIGEST,

supra note 43, at 443.

198. Id.
199. On the Cuban quarantine, see generally D.
O'CONNELL, LAW

OF

THE SEA,

GREIG,

supra note 44, at 339-40; 2

supra note 4, at 807-08; 4 WHITEMAN'S

note 43, at 523-29; 5 WHITEMAN'S DIGEST, supra note 43, at 440-50.

DIGEST,

supra
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action, bringing it within the scope of Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter; the sanction of a regional organization, which derived further
validity from the reference to regional arrangements or agencies in Article
52 of the Charter; and the "reasonableness of the claim" coupled with
international toleration and acquiescence.200

Despite this plenitude of rationalizations-and perhaps because of
it-the quarantine remains a controversial issue.
The quarantine incident, due to its mixed nature, yields few lessons
useful to this Note's inquiry. While self-defense undoubtedly played a
role in the decision to impose the quarantine, too many other elements
are present in the equation to draw any substantive conclusions from the
incident vis-a-vis the nature of the right of self-defense on the high seas.
Truly, hard cases make bad law.2 ' Perhaps the most that one may conclude from the incident is that "even in peacetime States do take exceptional measures of enforcement jurisdiction on the high seas, any opposition from other States being insufficient to deter them. ' 20 2 And this is
not an insignificant observation.
6.

The Torrey Canyon Incident

In 1967, the Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon grounded on
seas off Cornwall, England, spilling over 100,000 tons of crude
United Kingdom ordered the bombing of the wreckage, hoping
the oil to reduce the pollution damage. The British Government
the bombing as an act of self-defense.2 03

the high
oil. The
to ignite
justified

200. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 808 (citing Chayes, Law
and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550 (1963); Christol & Davies, supra
note 163; Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction:National and
Collective Self-Defense Claims Valid under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 335 (1962)) (footnote omitted). Greig concludes that "it is difficult to accept the
American contention that it was their naval quarantine which was necessitated on the
grounds of self-defence." D. GREIG, supra note 44, at 341; see also Chayes, The Legal
Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 47 DEP'T ST. BULL. 763 (1962).
201. Churchill and Lowe write, "[I]f the intention to create a precedent for future
behaviour is a desirable quality in State practice called in evidence to support the existence of a rule of customary law, then the [quarantine] incident is perhaps best forgotten." R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 153. O'Connell also concludes that
"[w]hatever be the plausibility of these justifications the Cuban Quarantine was a highly
exceptional matter with little value as a precedent in situations of self-defence which fall
short of global deterrence." 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 808.
202. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 153.
203. On the Torrey Canyon incident, see E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); C. GILL, F. BOOKER & T. SOPER, THE WRECK OF
THE TORREY CANYON (1967).
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Subsequent international practice and opinion bear out the legitimacy
of the British action. At the time of the incident, however, the United
Kingdom's action was of questionable legality; the bombing of the vessel
was not clearly justifiable under then-existing customary international
law because the landing occurred on the high seas and not within British
territorial waters.2" 4 Accordingly, the United Kingdom agreed to submit
the matter to the International Maritime Organization. This action resulted ultimately in the Intervention Convention of 1969, which provides
that party states
may take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which
may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.20 5
Before taking defensive measures, the interested state must consult with
experts and notify affected parties.20 8 A state may forego consultation
and notification, however, when the danger is imminent.20 7 All measures
taken are subject to the Caroline constraints of necessity and reasonableness; defensive measures must reflect the probability and extent of imminent injury, the probable effectiveness of the measures selected, and the
extent of damage likely to be inflicted thereby.20 8 A state must pay compensation for measures that prove excessive or unreasonable.2 0 9
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea makes no remarkable
204. If the landing had occurred within British territorial waters, the United Kingdom presumably could have taken any measures it saw fit to protect itself. See 2
O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 1007. A vessel grounding and spilling
oil within the territorial sea of a state does not enjoy the right of innocent passage since
she is neither "innocent" nor "in passage." See Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 7, arts. 17-19 (defining innocent passage). Similarly, customary international law
would likely permit a state to take defensive actions in response to a landing within the
state's contiguous zone. Within its contiguous zone, a state enjoys a special competence
with regard to the enforcement of its protective laws. See supra note 181.
205. Convention on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, openedfor signature Nov. 29, 1969, art. I, 26 U.S.T. 765, 767, T.I.A.S. No. 8068,
970 U.N.T.S. 211 (entered into force May 6, 1975) [hereinafter Intervention Convention]. A subsequent protocol authorizes the affected state to intercede in cases of pollution
other than oil. See Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil, opened for signatureNov. 2, 1973, U.S.T. -,

206.
207.
208.
209.

T.I.A.S. No. 10561, -

See
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.N.T.S. -

(entered into force Mar. 30, 1983).

Intervention Convention, supra note 205, art. III(a)-(c).
art. III(d).
arts. I, V.
art. VI.
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contribution to this issue. 210 Nevertheless, the Convention does acknowledge the
right of States, pursuant to international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related
interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following
upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which
may
211
reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.
Here again, the right to take offensive measures is shaped by the exigencies of the circumstances, consistent with the Caroline equation.2 12
Both the Intervention Convention and the Convention on the Law of
the Sea indicate that coastal states have a right to take defensive measures on the high seas against vessels threatening their coastline, subject
to the twin constraints of necessity and reasonableness. Given the readiness with which states have accepted these provisions, one may reasonably argue that these rules are generally declaratory of existing customary
law.2 1 This is, however, by no means clear.
C.

Summary

These few incidents of state practice, far from being conclusive, merely
hint at the vague parameters within which a state may lawfully act in its
own self-defense on the high seas. While no simple equation may be
210. The Convention does purport to grant states jurisdiction for the suppression of
the discharge of oil by non-national ships sailing in the state's territorial sea, contiguous

zone, or exclusive economic zone. When "clear grounds" exist for believing a foreign
vessel has polluted the waters near a state, the affected state may request information
from the vessel. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 220(3). In extreme
cases, the state may submit the vessel to visitation and inspection. Id. art. 220(5). When
sufficient evidence exists that the vessel has caused "major damage or threat of major
damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State," that state may detain the
vessel and bring proceedings against her. Id. art. 220(6).
211. Id. art. 221(1).
212. See supra part VI, section A.
213. Churchill and Lowe observe:
Whether a coastal State possesses powers of intervention on the high seas under
customary international law, as [the Convention on the Law of the Sea] assumes,
is perhaps controversial. At least, there must have been some doubt about this
question, for otherwise it would not seem necessary to have concluded the Intervention Convention. On the other hand, it can be argued that the United Kingdom's action against the Torrey Canyon in 1967, coupled with its ready acceptance
by other States, constituted an emerging rule of customary international law which
the Intervention Convention simply crystallised and clarified.
R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 119, at 232.
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derived from existing state practice and opinion, certain broad conclusions are supportable. Most important, it is clear that states do indeed
possess an inherent right to defend themselves against threats to their
territorial integrity or political security. States take defensive actions in
time of extremity, and other states often support these actions.
At other times, however, states will condemn actions taken in the
name of self-defense. The line that separates proper from improper defensive actions is not bright. Still, the ancient Caroline maxim is frequently borne out in practice; there must exist a "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."214 While a strict application of this maxim is
inappropriate, a state is probably unjustified in taking defensive actions
unless it is laboring under the weight of necessity. State practice indicates that the right of self-defense will arise whenever the state is suffering or is likely to suffer an injury to some territorial, political, environmental, or other important interest. The gravity or relative importance of
the interest does not significantly affect the determination whether the
right of self-defense obtains. The weight of the interest appears relevant
only to the reasonableness of the action taken to prevent it; a more important interest will justify a more ardent defense. The threat must,
however, be sufficiently grave to justify encroachment upon the traditional and dearly-held freedom of the high seas. That is, hypothetical
threats are insufficent.
When a state has the right to take defensive action-that is, when the
state is suffering or is likely to suffer an injury to a substantial state
interest-it is constrained to act in a reasonable manner proportionate to
the threat. This limitation is the second element of the Caroline rule; the
defensive act should contain "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since
the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it."1215 The incidents of state practice
discussed above demonstrate that defensive actions of a scope disproportionate to the threat are consistently criticized by the international community. On the other hand, reasonable acts that are consonant with the
nature of the threat, and which are carefully tailored to address the specific danger posed by the threat, are applauded by states-or at least
tolerated by them. This is the teaching of Caroline, and it is the lesson
of state practice.

214. Caroline Letter, supra note 160.
215. Id.; see supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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THE PIRATE RADIO BROADCASTER EXCEPTION

The past few decades have seen an increase in the abuse of international radio regulations by individuals operating from "pirate" broadcasting stations aboard ships on the high seas. The problem has particularly affected Western Europe,216 where at one time eleven pirate
transmitters were in operation on the Baltic Sea, the Irish Sea, and the
North Sea. 21 7 Consistent with their romantic appellation, pirate broadcasters plunder the airwaves in contravention of existing international
and regional broadcasting laws,2"' compromising the careful system of
international radio frequency allocation.219

216. Western Europe is a likely target for pirate broadcasters. Radio there is largely
state-run and noncommercial; radio pirates attempt to skirt these limitations and offer
programming of broader appeal than that offered by the staid, traditional European
broadcasters. Hunnings, Pirate Broadcasting in European Waters, 14 I.C.L.Q. 410,
410-20 (1965); see Robertson, The Suppression of PirateRadio Broadcasting:A Test
Case of the InternationalSystem for Control of Activities Outside National Territory,
45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 72, 75-76 (Winter 1982); Smith, PirateBroadcasting,
41 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 770-72 (1968); van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, Legal Aspects
of Pirate Broadcasting, 60 A.J.I.L. 303, 309-11 (1966).
217. Pirate broadcasting reached its apex in the mid-1960s and has since declined.
Radio Caroline, however, has been broadcasting intermittently from the Caroline since
March 1964 and is somewhat of a legend in the business. Registered in Panama, the
Caroline began transmitting to Eastern England and Holland, but later moved off the
Irish coast. C. COLOMnOS, supra note 9, at 144; H. MEYERS, supra note 131, at 315 &
n.5; Hunnings, supra note 216, at 410-12. The Carolinesuccessfully avoided the laws of
several European states for several years, only to sink in 1979 during a storm at sea.
Robertson, supra note 216, at 71. Apparently, however, Radio Caroline has since been
resurrected. While up at Cambridge in 1987, as I wrote portions of this Note, my radio
was tuned to Radio Caroline-which purported to be "Rockin' you from the North
Sea!" The long life of Radio Caroline, in its various incarnations, points up the difficulty
of effectively silencing pirate broadcasters.
218. See generally Evensen, Aspects of InternationalLaw Relating to Modern Radio Communications, 115 RECUEIL DES CouRS 471, 564-67 (1965); Hunnings, supra
note 216, at 413-24; Robertson, supra note 216, at 72-74; van Panhuys & van Emde
Boas, supra note 216, at 304-11.
219. One writer observes:
The basic problem presented by pirate radio stations was that they struck at the
very heart of the comprehensive and sophisticated national and international regulatory schemes adopted by the international community to ensure order and noninterference between uses and users of the radio spectrum. Since the spectrum of
radio frequencies allocated to radio broadcasting is limited and a large number of
broadcasting stations were competing for places on the spectrum, the intrusion of
broadcasting stations free to pick their own frequencies and radiated-power levels
was bound to create interference with other stations.
Robertson, supra note 216, at 75 (footnote omitted).
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Efforts to curb pirate radio have so far met with limited success.
While many affected states have enacted legislation criminalizing unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas,220 enforcement of such legislation consistently proves problematic.22 x The central difficulty encountered is, not surprisingly, the questionable legitimacy of extending the
state's enforcement jurisdiction over non-national vessels suspected of unauthorized broadcasting on the high seas.2 22 A state is, of course, competent to arrest on the high seas troublesome vessels flying under its flag as
well as stateless vessels. 223 Often, however, the pirate broadcasting ship
is registered to a state unable or simply unwilling to cooperate in the
suppression of this activity.22 4 In this case, the enforcing state can exercise jurisdiction provided it acts pursuant to some customary or conventional exception to the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction; a state
may not assume jurisdictional competence over radio pirates by legislative fiat. 22 5 To justify a state's assertion of jurisdiction solely on the basis

220. Such laws have been enacted by the Scandinavian states, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and Belgium. 20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 81519; Evensen, supra note 218, at 569-74; Hunnings, supra note 216, at 417-22; Smith,
supra note 216, at 806-14; van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 216, at 307-09.
221. Enforcement of international radio frequency regulations is left to individual
states, which must take measures to ensure that vessels on the high seas under their flag
comport with the appropriate norms. But "[r]eliance upon the law of the flag to prevent
'pirate radio' broadcasting [has] proved to be ineffective." 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE
SEA, supra note 4, at 815.
222. Hunnings observes, "The difficulties have arisen because the stations ... have
been operating in international waters either without a flag or with a flag of convenience
only. The basic problem is, therefore, one of jurisdiction ....

"

Hunnings, supra note

216, at 412 (footnotes omitted).
The case of pirate broadcasting from ships [is] particularly difficult because there
is no authority in international law for boarding a foreign ship on the high seas,
even when it is engaged in activities contrary to the law of the State against which
these activities are directed, and even when the offenders are nationals of that
State.
20'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 816.
223. See supra part V, section A.
224. Often, pirate broadcasters fly under flags of convenience or without a flag. Radio Syd, for example broadcast from an Honduran vessel; Radio Mercur from a Guatemalan vessel; and Radio Veronica and Radio Caroline from Panamanian vessels. Hunnings, supra note 216, at 410-12. On flags of convenience, see supra note 148.
225. Two publicists observe:
[G]overnments contemplating measures against such stations will have to be sure
that they will be able to justify their action from the point of view of international
law. If they cannot base the action on general treaties, they must fall back on the
rules or principles of general international law.
van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 216, at 304.
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of the state's desire to proscribe broadcasting from the high seas would
offend the principle of exclusive flag-state jurisdiction.
International efforts to address the inherent difficulties in unilateral
extensions of enforcement jurisdiction over unauthorized broadcasters
have resulted in a number of multilateral declarations and conventions.
In 1965, the Council of Europe opened for signature the European
Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations
Outside National Territories (European Agreement).2 26 Under the European Agreement, signatory states are obliged to punish individuals
aboard ships under its flag who are engaged in or assisting with unauthorized broadcasting. 227 While the European Agreement permits states
to punish non-nationals as well as nationals found aboard its ships,22
the treaty does not authorize signatories to proceed against one another's
ships. No mutual droit de visite is conceded, leaving the European
Agreement without teeth. Professor Bowett observes, "The interesting
aspect of this Agreement is that it does not contemplate any unusual
jurisdiction: that is to say, the jurisdiction of each State is confined to its
own territory, its own ships, aircraft or nationals-and this is perfectly
consistent with the rules of international law. ' 229 The European Agreement, while evincing a growing state practice condemning unauthorized
broadcasting, does little to remedy the core problem of jurisdiction.
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention purports to fill the lacunae of
the European Agreement by providing a right of visit and search to specially interested states. Under the Convention, a state may board a nonnational vessel reasonably suspected of unauthorized broadcasting,23 0
provided the state receives the unauthorized broadcasts or otherwise231sufIf
fers from radio interference caused by the pirate broadcasters.

226. European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories, opened for signatureJan. 22, 1965, 1968 U.K.T.S.
No. I (Cmd. 3497), 634 U.N.T.S. 239 [hereinafter European Agreement]; see 2
O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 4, at 817-18; 9 WHITEMAN'S DIGEST, supra
note 43, at 792-94; Evensen, supra note 218, at 574-77; Robertson, supra note 216, at
94-96; Smith, supra note 216, at 801-05; van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note

216, at
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

324-26.
European Agreement, supra note 226, art. 2.
Id. art. 3.
D. BOWETT, supra note 149, at 55.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(1)(c).
Id. art. 109(3). The Convention defines unauthorized broadcasting as "the

transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the
high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international regulations." Id. art. 109(2). The relevant provision, article 190, reads in full:
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting
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boarding does not discharge the suspicion of the boarding party, the
boarding party may proceed to search the vessel, 2 ' arrest her, and seize
her broadcasting apparatus."' The arresting state may then prosecute
those engaged in the unlawful broadcasting-no matter what their nationality.2 34 The Convention therefore purports to invest affected states
with judicial, legislative, and enforcement jurisdiction over radio pirates.
While the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention attempts to make a novel
and useful contribution to the existing body of international law, it is
hardly without defect. The provision granting the flag-state jurisdiction
over non-national radio broadcasters is uncontroversial if intended
merely to apply to treaty parties inter se. States may agree among themselves to concede a mutual droit de visite.
This particular provision, however, cannot properly be viewed as a
codification of existing customary law. As already observed, international
law has not drawn an exception to the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction in the case of pirate broadcasters.23 5 The right to exercise jurisdiction over radio pirates is a conventional right only and therefore is not
opposable to states not party to the 1982 Convention. The inclusion of
this provision in the Convention and the willingness of states to commit

from the high seas.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, "unauthorized broadcasting" means the
transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on
the high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international
regulations, but excluding the transmission of distress calls.
3. Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting may be prosecuted before
the court of:
(a) the flag State of the ship;
(b) the State of registry of the installation;
(c) the State of which the person is a national;
(d) any State where the transmission can be received; or
(e) any State where authorized radio communication is suffering interference.
4. On the high seas, a State having jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 3
may, in conformity with article 110, arrest any person or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting apparatus.
Id. art. 190.
232. Id. art. 110(2).
233. Id. art. 109(4).
234. Id. art. 109(3).
235. One writer, referring to this provision as "an exercise in overkill," observes that
[t]o grant to any state in which a broadcast can be received the authority to board
a ship ... and to arrest and prosecute the persons or ships involved is a drastic
departure from the traditional fr6edoms of the high seas and the principle of the
exclusive jurisdiction of flag states over ships flying their flags.
Robertson, supra note 216, at 101.
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themselves to it is puzzling. The travaux prkparatoiresoffer no explanation. One must assume the drafters of the Convention intended this
provision as a progressive development that would over time pass into
the general corpus of customary international law.23 6 In any event, this
provision is at least enforceable by parties to the Convention inter se
even if party states cannot visit non-party state vessels. In this one respect, the Convention is an improvement upon the impotent European
Agreement.3 7
To summarize, customary international law does not permit states to
interfere with non-national ships suspected of unauthorized broadcasting
from the high seas. States, in the enforcement of broadcasting regulations, must rely upon their neighbors to mind their own shipping. Alternatively, states may enter into treaty arrangements with other states,
conceding a mutual droit de visite for the suppression of pirate broadcasting. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea authorizes such a
reciprocal right of visit. A state cannot, however, exercise the Convention
provisions against the shipping of non-parties without offending the exclusivity rule of flag-state jurisdiction.
VIII.

THE SAME STATE EXCEPTION

The 1958 High Seas Convention and the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea both provide that a warship may visit any vessel that the
warship has reasonable grounds to suspect that "though flying a foreign
flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality of the warship. ' 23 8 The legal basis for the assertion of competence over such vessels flows from the principle of flag-state jurisdiction;
a state has jurisdiction over ships registered under its laws.2 9 If the vessel belongs to the state of the warship, the warship may assert jurisdic-

236. Customary international law may flow from treaty provisions of a specific nature, given extensive and uniform state practice in accord with the provision, which practice evinces a belief that the practice is legally mandated. See North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den./W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 41-42.
237. Actually, the 1982 Convention as applicable only to treaty parties may yield
very satisfactory results if the Convention ever comes into force; most affected states are
signatories to the Convention, as are the states from which radio pirates frequently hail.
See UNITED NATIONS,

supra note 7, at 190.

238. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 6, art. 22(1)(c); Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 7, art. 110(1)(e); see also R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra
note 119, at 151; see, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v. Petrulla, 457 F. Supp. 1367 (M.D. Fla.
1979).
239. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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tion over her as any ship of the flag-state. Should the vessel actually be a
non-national vessel, the state of the warship must compensate the vessel
for any injury done her without good cause."' 0
IX.

SUMMARY

This Note has followed the cautious process of the law of nations with
respect to interference with non-national ships on the high seas. While
international law has made improvements and innovations over the
course of the preceding centuries, the fundamental principle of the exclusivity of flag-state jurisdiction remains the general rule; no state may
assert competence over ships lawfully flying the flag of another state except in singular circumstances. Exceptions to this general rule derive
only from customary law or the binding agreements of states. These exceptions, which comprise the body of this Note, permit states momentarily to push aside the general rule of the exclusivity of flag-state jurisdiction when a non-national vessel encountered on the high seas is
reasonably suspected of being a pirate, a trader in slaves, a stateless ship,
a threat to the security or integrity of the state, a disguised ship of the
interfering state, or, arguably, a pirate broadcaster. These exceptions are
precisely that-small chinks in an otherwise firm pillar of the law of
nations.
Robert C. F. Reuland*

240. See supra note 40. If the vessel is flying a flag of convenience, the assertion of
jurisdiction over her raises an interesting legal problem. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
* I remain grateful to Professor D.W. Bowett, Whewell Professor of International
Law, Queens' College, Cambridge University, for his time and attention in the preparation of this Note which, regardless of its relative merits, is the better for his guidance.

